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A TALE OF THREE PREJUDICES: RESTRUCTURING
THE “MARTINEZ GATEWAY”
Michael Ellis *
Abstract: Martinez v. Ryan opened a door previously closed to federal habeas petitioners.
In the past, where attorney negligence or a pro se defendant’s lack of legal knowledge caused
ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims to be procedurally defaulted, those claims were
likely lost forever. Now, following Martinez, petitioners get a second chance should they
satisfy the Supreme Court’s four-pronged test. The Martinez test, however, is not a simple
one. This Comment addresses some problems concerning the four-pronged test, including
multiple and conflicting standards for the same element, tensions between Martinez and the
underlying Strickland v. Washington ineffective-assistance-of-counsel standard, and
confusion where the same term of art is used in different contexts. The proposed
modifications would simplify Martinez for petitioners—ideally resulting in more evidentiary
hearings exploring underlying ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims in federal district
court.

INTRODUCTION
In the vast majority of cases, litigants in the United States get a single
bite of the apple. The issue, case, or appeal may be waived, barred by the
passage of time, or simply lost on the merits. The litigant is then
precluded from raising the issue or claim in a subsequent proceeding.
The same principle generally applies to habeas corpus—if a petitioner
fails to raise a claim at the appropriate moment or before the correct
court, that ground for relief could very well be forfeited forever. When a
state court dismisses or rejects a habeas petitioner’s alleged grounds for
relief on a procedural basis (for example, the failure to comply with a
statute of limitations), federal courts will deem such claims
“procedurally defaulted.” 1 Out of deference to the state court’s prior
determination, federal habeas courts generally will not adjudicate such
defaulted claims. 2 While there are a variety of mechanisms by which a
*

The author was a judicial extern in the Chambers of Judge Robert Lasnik of the District Court for
the Western District of Washington from January to March 2014. As an extern, the author assisted
in drafting the order in Weber v. Sinclair, No. C08-1676RSL, 2014 WL 1671508 (W.D. Wash. Apr.
28, 2014), cited throughout this Comment.
1. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 728–30 (1991).
2. Id.

405

13 - Ellis - final.docx (Do Not Delete)

406

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

4/13/2015 11:59 AM

[Vol. 90:405

habeas petitioner may resurrect barred claims, each carries a high burden
of proof. 3 The most common method of breathing life into a
procedurally defaulted claim requires the habeas petitioner to
demonstrate both “cause” for not raising the claim below and
“prejudice” from not being allowed another shot at the merits in a
federal proceeding. 4
Petitioners seeking to resurrect ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claims once faced the same gauntlet as all other procedurally defaulted
habeas grounds for relief. 5 If a petitioner fails to raise an ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claim in an earlier state court proceeding, it
becomes exceedingly difficult to reach the merits of that ground for
relief during any subsequent federal review. 6 This situation was
exacerbated by the United States Supreme Court’s 1991 decision in
Coleman v. Thompson, 7 which held that an attorney’s ineffective
assistance could not constitute the “cause” required for a petitioner to
resurrect a procedurally defaulted claim. 8
In 2012, the Supreme Court narrowly opened the door previously
sealed by Coleman. Under Martinez v. Ryan, 9 petitioners can now use
either their state post-conviction review (PCR) counsel’s ineffectiveness
or their own status as a pro se litigant as the “cause” necessary to excuse
a procedural default. 10 Part of the Court’s reasoning was that effective
assistance of counsel is a “bedrock principle in our justice system.” 11
Due to a variety of factors—including the need for both an expanded

3. See Lee Kovarsky, Death Ineligibility and Habeas Corpus, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 329, 336
(2010) (describing how the Supreme Court, in its cases after Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963),
“ratcheted up the cause and prejudice standard under the auspices of the Court’s equitable authority
over the writ”); Morgan Suder, Comment, Harmonizing Equitable Exceptions: Why Courts Should
Recognize an “Actual Innocence” Exception to the AEDPA’s Statute of Limitations, 49 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 1283, 1286 (2012) (noting that “[p]risoners rarely meet the extremely high burden [for the
actual innocence exception] because the standard for proving innocence is so high”).
4. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750; Justin F. Marceau, Is Guilt Dispositive? Federal Habeas After
Martinez, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2071, 2115 (2014) (noting that “the most common way to argue
that a procedural default ought not to apply is for the prisoner to demonstrate ‘cause and
prejudice’”).
5. See, e.g., Bonds v. Vail, No. C09–5239 RJB/KLS, 2009 WL 3713067, at *9 (W.D. Wash. Nov.
4, 2009) (noting that “[u]nder Coleman, an error of appellate counsel on a discretionary appeal
simply cannot constitute cause to excuse a procedural default in a federal habeas proceeding”).
6. See, e.g., Kovarsky, supra note 3, at 336.
7. 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
8. Id. at 753–54.
9. __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012).
10. See id. at 1315, 1318.
11. Id. at 1317.
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record and new counsel—direct review is often not the most appropriate
procedural phase for adjudicating ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel
(IATC) claims. 12 One of the Court’s primary concerns was that, where a
state required an IATC claim to be initially raised on collateral review,
an incompetent counsel or the petitioner’s own unfamiliarity with the
legal system could result in a procedural default.13
However, the Martinez test is not a simple one. 14 It requires a
petitioner to establish four elements concerning his or her defaulted
claim: (1) the claim is “substantial”; (2) the state PCR counsel was
ineffective or there was no PCR counsel; (3) the claim was initially
heard in state PCR proceedings; and (4) the claim was required, under
state procedural law, to be raised in the state PCR proceeding. 15 While
the Supreme Court subsequently altered the fourth prong, 16 Martinez
still controls the first three. Although courts refer to the Martinez test in
different ways, 17 this Comment will style it as the “Martinez gateway,” 18
due largely to its procedural similarities with the “actual innocence
gateway.” 19
12. See id. at 1318.
13. See id. at 1316. Where a state forces petitioners to initially raise IATC claims on collateral
review, a procedural default would bar any court from ever being able to adjudicate that ground for
relief. Under Coleman, a PCR attorney’s negligence does not qualify as “cause,” so a defense
counsel’s error in an initial PCR proceeding could not be used to demonstrate “cause and
prejudice.” Further, as the state procedural rule would be both independent of the federal ground as
well as adequate to support the judgment, the Supreme Court “on direct review of the state
proceeding could not consider or adjudicate the claim.” Id.
14. See, e.g., Robin C. Konrad, Post-Conviction and Prejudice: The Ninth Circuit’s Application
of Martinez in Pending Capital Cases, 7 PHOENIX L. REV. 289, 319–27 (2013) (describing
complications that have arisen concerning the various “prejudice” determinations).
15. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318–21.
16. See Trevino v. Thaler, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1921 (2013) (modifying the fourth
Martinez prong so that a petitioner may take advantage of Martinez where a state’s procedural
framework “makes it highly unlikely in a typical case that a defendant will have a meaningful
opportunity to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal”).
17. The Martinez standard has been referred to by a number of different names in various courts.
See, e.g., Langdeaux v. Lund, No. C12-4081-MWB, 2014 WL 2093860, at *10 (N.D. Iowa May 20,
2014) (“the exception found in Martinez v. Ryan”); Givens v. Jindal, No. 13-00089-BAJ-SCR, 2014
WL 68722, at *2 (M.D. La. Jan. 8, 2014) (“Martinez v. Ryan”); Fodor v. Palmer, No. 3:12-cv00330-MMD-VPC, 2013 WL 3864245, at *3 (D. Nev. July 23, 2013) (“a claim under Martinez v.
Ryan”).
18. At least one scholar has previously used the term “Martinez gateway.” Nancy J. King,
Enforcing Effective Assistance After Martinez, 122 YALE L.J. 2428, 2433 (2013); see also Toliver v.
Pfister, 13 C 8679, 2014 WL 4245788, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 2014) (quoting King, supra).
19. The actual innocence gateway also requires a petitioner to make a certain showing in order to
overcome a procedural default and have the underlying claims heard on the merits. Schlup v. Delo,
513 U.S. 298, 314 (1995). In this manner it functions similarly to the “cause and prejudice”
petitioners must show under Coleman in order to reach their substantive claims. If satisfied, both
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The Martinez test is not without its problems. The exact language of
the opinion is open to interpretation, as the Court included conflicting
definitions for the same element. 20 There are also inherent tensions
between Martinez and the incorporated Strickland v. Washington 21
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel standard. 22 Further, the Court did not
go far enough to ensure that the high burden placed on petitioners by
Strickland does not swallow the equitable exception designed in
Martinez.
This Comment analyzes, and offers suggestions for improving, two
facets of Martinez that prove troublesome for lower courts and are
overly burdensome on federal habeas petitioners. Part I briefly outlines
federal habeas law including the “cause and prejudice” equitable
exception. Part II examines Strickland v. Washington and the
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel standard. Part III analyzes both
Coleman v. Thompson and Martinez v. Ryan, the two central cases in
this Comment. Part IV examines the Martinez “substantiality” prong. It
argues that federal district courts should impose a lower burden for
“substantial” IATC claims and conduct a greater number of evidentiary
hearings on the underlying grounds for relief. Part V argues that, as all
three potential prejudice determinations scattered throughout
Martinez/Coleman look to the same underlying issue—trial counsel’s
alleged ineffectiveness—all such analyses should be adjudicated under
the same, lower standard of “substantiality,” as opposed to a full
Strickland showing of “actual prejudice.” Federal district courts should
utilize these suggestions to allow more habeas petitioners through the
“Martinez gateway.” This would result in more potentially meritorious
IATC claims being adjudicated on the record—an outcome that could
grant justice to some who did not get a fair shake at the trial level.

gateways allow a federal habeas petitioner to overcome a procedural default and have their claims
adjudicated on the merits.
20. Compare Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318 (describing the first prong as requiring a “substantial”
showing which has “some merit,” as analogized to Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003)), with
Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1319 (defining an “insubstantial” claim as one that “does not have any merit
or that . . . is wholly without factual support”). See infra Part IV.
21. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
22. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318. Under the Strickland two-pronged test, a court must “first
determine whether counsel’s representation ‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness’”
and then “ask whether ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366
(2010) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694).
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HABEAS CORPUS IN THE UNITED STATES

In order to understand Martinez’s place in the federal habeas system,
it is necessary to examine habeas corpus both generally and in the
context of procedural default. This Part begins with a big-picture
overview of federal habeas law. Next, it discusses the doctrine of
procedural default as well as the various equitable exceptions that can
potentially resurrect a forfeited claim, in particular “cause and
prejudice.”
A.

A (Very) Brief History of Habeas

The doctrine of habeas corpus is built around the simple tenet that “no
man would be imprisoned contrary to the law of the land.”23 This
principle was given constitutional significance in the Suspension
Clause. 24 The Framers were able to take advantage of centuries of legal
development through English constitutional history. 25 This shared
cultural experience, along with the Framers’ own tribulations during the
Revolutionary Era, 26 motivated them to permanently enshrine habeas
rights in the fledgling Constitution. 27
23. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 740 (2008). This idea stems from the Magna Carta. See
Amanda L. Tyler, The Forgotten Core Meaning of the Suspension Clause, 125 HARV. L. REV. 901,
924 (2012) (“[T]he [writ of habeas corpus] enjoyed a long and celebrated link with English
conceptions of due process rooted in Magna Carta or the ‘Great Charter.’”). Habeas is traced to
Chapter Thirty-Nine, which translated from the original Latin reads, “[n]o freemen shall be taken or
imprisoned, or stripped of his rights or possessions, or outlawed or exiled, or deprived of his
standing in any other way, nor will we proceed with force against him, or send others to do so
except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.” MAGNA CARTA, ch. 39
(1215), translation from http://www.bl.uk/collection-items/magna-carta-1215. While there has been
some debate concerning the viability of a link between the Magna Carta and modern habeas, the
document is widely considered the root of common-law habeas corpus. See Max Radin, The Myth of
Magna Carta, 60 HARV. L. REV. 1060, 1060–61 (1947) (arguing that “whatever lex terre [the law of
the land] does mean . . . it is nothing like the notion of ‘due process,’ as it has been developed,
chiefly in the United States”).
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”).
25. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 740–45 (discussing the “painstaking” development of the Writ).
26. See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 337–38 (2001) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“This was a distinct abuse of majority power, and one that had manifested itself often in
the Framers’ experience: temporarily but entirely eliminating the ‘Privilege of the Writ’ for a certain
geographic area or areas, or for a certain class or classes of individuals.”); James Robertson, Quo
Vadis, Habeas Corpus?, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 1063, 1071 (2008) (“Every member of the Constitutional
Convention that convened in Philadelphia 110 years after the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 knew
about it. English history was their history, after all, so they knew that the Great Writ had been
forged on the anvil of struggle between King and Parliament over nearly a century.”).
27. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 741 (noting that “habeas relief often was denied by the courts or
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Habeas corpus has played a prominent role in American jurisprudence
dating back to the nation’s founding. 28 Chief Justice John Marshall
described it as a “great constitutional privilege.” 29 Other documents
from the founding generation share this viewpoint. 30 As the Supreme
Court has explained, “[a]lthough in form the Great Writ is simply a
mode of procedure, its history is inextricably intertwined with the
growth of fundamental rights of personal liberty.” 31 The core of common
law habeas has been that no civilized society can permit its government
to deprive citizens of liberty without accountability. 32 The use and
adjudication of the writ has long been viewed as an “incident of federal
judicial power.” 33
A habeas claim is in essence an allegation that the government is
holding the petitioner in custody in violation of law. 34 The writ functions
as a remedy for those whose continued restraint is deemed unlawful.35
Should a reviewing court determine that the restraint is illegal, “the
individual is entitled to his immediate release.” 36 Habeas relief can take
a variety of forms, including new trials or sentencing proceedings. 37
As an essential mechanism in the system of government established
by the Framers, habeas law has developed over the centuries into its own

suspended by Parliament”). Justice Kennedy comments that “[t]his history was known to the
Framers” and played an influential role in their decision to grant considerable protection to habeas
corpus in the Constitution. See id. at 742–43.
28. See id. at 742–45.
29. Ex Parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 95 (1807). Many different Justices have expressed a
similar sentiment over the years. See, e.g., Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 26 (1939) (“It must
never be forgotten that the writ of habeas corpus is the precious safeguard of personal liberty and
there is no higher duty than to maintain it unimpaired.”).
30. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 512 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (citing
Blackstone for the conclusion that the Habeas Corpus Act is a remedy for the “fatal evil” of
“arbitrary imprisonments . . . the favorite and most formidable instruments of tyranny”).
31. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 401 (1963).
32. See id. at 402 (“[The Writ’s] root principle is that in a civilized society, government must
always be accountable to the judiciary for a man’s imprisonment: if the imprisonment cannot be
shown to conform with the fundamental requirements of law, the individual if entitled to his
immediate release.”).
33. McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131, 135 (1934) (noting that this power is “implicitly recognized
by” the Suspension Clause).
34. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (2012); see also Larry Yankle, Explaining Habeas Corpus, 60
N.Y.U. L. REV. 991, 999 (1985).
35. See Fay, 372 U.S. at 401–02.
36. Id. at 402.
37. See, e.g., Ramchair v. Conway, 601 F.3d 66, 78 (2d Cir. 2010) (affirming district court grant
of a new trial); Chioino v. Kernan, 581 F.3d 1182, 1186 (9th Cir. 2009) (directing district court to
remand matter to state trial court for resentencing).
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brand of unique and often perplexing litigation. Even with extensive
congressional interference, 38 the Court has long noted that justice is at
the core of the Great Writ.39 The fact that Congress, despite being
granted wide-ranging powers in the Constitution, can suspend the writ
only in very limited circumstances demonstrates that the writ is a “vital
instrument for the protection of individual liberty.” 40
As all fifty states have their own distinct legal systems, 41 the federal
habeas pathway creates a means by which persons convicted at the state
level can have their federal constitutional claims adjudicated in a federal
forum. 42 State court defendants must generally exhaust their own state’s
PCR procedures before the federal alternative becomes available. 43 As
such, many habeas proceedings can extend years after conviction as a

38. See, e.g., John H. Blume, AEDPA: The “Hype” and the “Bite”, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 259,
263–64 (2006) (noting how to habeas critics, federal court review of state criminal judgments has
created “federal-state friction, disrupted the state’s legitimate interest in finality, and undermined
effective law enforcement”); Emily G. Uhrig, The Sacrifice of Unarmed Prisoners to Gladiators:
The Post-AEDPA Access-To-the-Courts Demand For a Constitutional Right to Counsel in Federal
Habeas Corpus, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1219, 1227 (2012) (discussing how AEDPA advocates had
“identified habeas practice . . . as the source of unacceptable delay between conviction and
execution”).
39. See, e.g., Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 515 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (mentioning
that “the history of the Court’s jurisprudence . . . unambiguously requires that we carefully preserve
the exception which enables the federal writ to grant relief in cases of manifest injustice”); Johnson
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 467 (1938) (describing habeas corpus as “a constitutional guaranty
specifically designed to prevent injustice”).
40. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 743 (2008); see also Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus,
Suspension and Guantánamo: The Boumediene Decision, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 15–16 (noting that
as Boumediene held that “the Suspension Clause affirmatively confers a right to habeas corpus
review,” Congress is limited to the suspension rationale enumerated in the Constitution).
41. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 504 (3d ed. 2001) (“In theory,
each state is sovereign. Each one has its own legal system.”).
42. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2012) (“[Federal courts] shall entertain an application for a writ of
habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the
ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States.”); Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners,
76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 463 (1963) (arguing that debate over habeas corpus assumes “it is the proper
function of the writ to provide a determination of the merits of all federal constitutional claims
arising in state criminal proceedings, no matter how fully these have been canvassed in the state
system”); Curtis R. Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Impact of an Abortive State Proceeding, 74
HARV. L. REV. 1315, 1316 (1961) (stating that “[i]t is a fundamental purpose of the habeas corpus
jurisdiction to secure the federal rights of state prisoners through an independent proceeding in a
federal forum”).
43. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) (requiring that “[a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus on
behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it
appears that—(A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State; or
(B)(i) there is an absence of available State corrective process; or (ii) circumstances exist that render
such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant”).
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petition makes its way through both the state and federal court
systems. 44
B.

Contemporary Federal Habeas Procedure: The Anti-Terrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act

The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA),45
enacted in 1996, governs contemporary federal habeas procedure. 46
Under AEDPA, federal courts are required to review state court
decisions with a substantial amount of deference, and can only grant
habeas relief in strictly limited circumstances.47 Congress’ goal in
enacting AEDPA was to promote “‘comity, finality, and federalism’ by
giving state courts ‘the first opportunity to review [the] claim,’ and to
‘correct’ any ‘constitutional violation in the first instance.’” 48 The statute
also altered various elements of federal habeas procedure.49 While
AEDPA’s supporters believed that the power of federal courts had been
sufficiently restrained, 50 the various equitable exceptions discussed in
the following Section have survived the statute’s passage. 51
One provision of federal habeas law amended by AEDPA, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254, greatly limits the discretion available to federal district courts
44. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 726–29 (1991). Roger Coleman’s state
conviction was upheld by the Virginia Supreme Court in 1983 and the Supreme Court did not
uphold the dismissal of his federal habeas petition until 1991. See id. at 727–29.
45. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
46. See, e.g., Blume, supra note 38, at 270–71 (described various procedural changes brought
about by AEDPA).
47. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)–(e); see, e.g., Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 778 (2010) (“The Court of
Appeals’ ruling in Lett’s favor failed to grant the Michigan courts the dual layers of deference
required by AEDPA.”). Compare Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 386 (2000) (“AEDPA plainly
sought to ensure a level of ‘deference to the determinations of state courts,’ provided those
determinations did not conflict with federal law or apply federal law in an unreasonable way.”
(internal citation omitted)), with id. (“On the other hand, it is significant that the word ‘deference’
does not appear in the text of [AEDPA] itself.”).
48. Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 220 (2002) (internal citations omitted).
49. See, e.g., Blume, supra note 38, at 270–71 (listing various procedural changes wrought by
AEDPA including a statute of limitations for habeas corpus cases, stringent restrictions on
successive petitions, limitations on the availability of evidentiary hearings, and changes to
exhaustion requirements).
50. See id. at 259–60 (noting that AEDPA supporters believed the bill would end “the years of
waiting to carry out executions” and “the days of a lone federal judge or panel of judges routinely
finding constitutional defects in state court convictions”).
51. See McQuiggin v. Perkins, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1932 (2013) (“The miscarriage of
justice exception, our decisions bear out, survived AEDPA’s passage.”); Lee Kovarsky, AEDPA’s
Wrecks: Comity, Finality, and Federalism, 82 TUL. L. REV. 443, 450 (2007) (noting that “AEDPA
actually did little to alter existing default doctrine”).
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when they entertain an application for the writ of habeas corpus filed by
a prisoner in state custody. 52 Under § 2254(d), when a claim has been
adjudicated on the merits in state court, a federal court may only grant
habeas relief if that adjudication
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in
the State court proceeding. 53
Further, § 2254(e)(2) mandates that, where the factual basis of a claim
has not been developed in a state court proceeding, a federal district
court can only hold an evidentiary hearing under very limited
circumstances. 54 While AEDPA poses serious obstacles to relief for
habeas petitioners to overcome, 55 any further discussion of its impact on
habeas is beyond the scope of this Comment.
C.

Equitable Exceptions (or How to Revive a Defaulted Habeas
Claim)

A federal district court cannot address every federal constitutional
claim a petitioner raises. Along with other doctrines,56 procedural default
may bar a district court from reviewing a petitioner’s asserted grounds
52. See AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 104, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996); Cullen v. Pinholster,
__ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011) (per curiam) (“As amended by AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 2254
sets several limits on the power of a federal court to grant an application for a writ of habeas corpus
on behalf of a state prisoner.”).
53. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)–(2) (2012).
54. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (“If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in
State court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the
applicant shows that (A) the claim relies on (i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to
cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or (ii) a factual
predicate that could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and
(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence
that but for the constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty
of the underlying offense.”); see also Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1400–01 (“Section 2254(e)(2)
imposes a limitation on the discretion of federal habeas courts to take evidence in an evidentiary
hearing.”).
55. See Kimberly A. Thomas, Substantive Habeas, 63 AM U. L. REV. 1749, 1775 (2014) (“In
summary, the Court, both before and after passage of AEDPA, has constrained state prisoners’
access to federal court by creating significant procedural barriers, and it has also answered many of
the pressing procedural questions left open by AEDPA. Despite these barriers, state inmates have
persisted in their pursuit of federal review and, at least in some cases, have surmounted the
procedural hurdles, albeit in smaller percentages than before AEDPA.”).
56. See, e.g., Blume, supra note 38, at 270–71 (listing various AEDPA procedural hurdles).
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for relief. 57 A habeas claim is procedurally defaulted where the state
court has “declined to address a prisoner’s federal claims because the
prisoner had failed to meet a state procedural requirement.” 58 In such a
case, a ruling on the alleged federal constitutional issue would be
superfluous as the decision already rests on independent and adequate
state procedural grounds. 59 Procedural default, although modified in
some cases, has survived the enactment of AEDPA. 60
After a claim is procedurally defaulted, two primary options exist by
which a federal habeas petitioner can revive the claim for a federal
district court to adjudicate on the merits. 61 A petitioner can either show
“cause and prejudice” for the procedural default or “demonstrate that the
failure to consider the claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of
justice.” 62 This Comment focuses on the “cause and prejudice” standard
and does not address the miscarriage-of-justice equitable exception. 63
The “cause and prejudice” standard for excusing a procedural default
was first articulated by the Supreme Court in 1973. 64 The test is based
generally on principles of comity and finality: federal courts should
respect and show deference to state court judgments unless a habeas

57. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991); Walker v. Martin, __ U.S. __, 131 S.
Ct. 1120, 1127 (2011) (noting that “federal habeas relief will be unavailable when (1) ‘a state court
[has] declined to address a prisoner’s federal claims because the prisoner had failed to meet a state
procedural requirement,’ and (2) ‘the state judgment rests on independent and adequate state
procedural grounds’” (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729–30)).
58. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729–30; see also Stephanie Dest, Federal Habeas Corpus and State
Procedural Default: An Abstention-Based Interest Analysis, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 264 (1989)
(noting that “[s]uch defaults usually involve traditional ‘make it or waive it’ defenses, such as
contemporaneous objections rules, in which appeals are forfeited if not made in a timely fashion”).
59. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 730; Todd E. Pettys, Killing Roger Coleman: Habeas, Finality, and
the Innocence Gap, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2313, 2341 n.163 (2007) (noting that the Coleman
decision declared that “as a general rule, all state procedural defaults are fatal in federal habeas
proceedings”). Cf. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040 (1983) (“Respect for the independence of
state courts, as well as avoidance of rendering advisory opinions, have been the cornerstones of this
Court’s refusal to decide cases where there is an adequate and independent state ground.”).
60. See Kovarsky, supra note 51, at 450 (noting that “AEDPA actually did little to alter existing
default doctrine”).
61. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.
62. Id. The miscarriage-of-justice exception manifests when petitioners raise actual-innocence
gateway claims. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 309 (1995).
63. For more information on the miscarriage-of-justice equitable exception, see Jay Nelson,
Facing up to Wrongful Convictions: Broadly Defining “New” Evidence at the Actual Innocence
Gateway, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 711, 712–17 (2008).
64. Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233, 242 (1973) (noting that “a claim once waived . . . may
not later be resurrected, either in the criminal proceedings or in federal habeas, in the absence of the
showing of ‘cause’”).
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petitioner can demonstrate a compelling rationale to do otherwise. 65
“Cause,” as described in Coleman v. Thompson, must be a force external
to the petitioner that “cannot fairly be attributed to him.” 66 While there
appears to be little direct guidance on the issue, prejudice—at a
minimum—demands the same standard as that required to demonstrate
an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim under Strickland v.
Washington. 67 Because the word prejudice appears in a number of
different contexts in this Comment, the prejudice required for the
equitable exception will be referred to as “Coleman prejudice.”
II.

INEFFECTIVE-ASSISTANCE-OF-COUNSEL: STRICKLAND V.
WASHINGTON

Ineffective-assistance–of-counsel constitutes one of the most common
habeas grounds for relief asserted by petitioners. 68 A petitioner alleging
65. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 135 (1982) (noting that “[t]he terms ‘cause’ and ‘actual
prejudice’ are not rigid concepts; they take their meaning from the principles of comity and
finality”); Rae K. Inafuku, Coleman v. Thompson—Sacrificing Fundamental Rights in Deference to
the States: The Supreme Court’s 1991 Interpretation of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 34 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 625, 647 (1994) (discussing how “[t]he Court found that [the cause and prejudice]
standard avoided an unnecessary retrial by balancing the state interests against federal concerns
protecting constitutional rights”).
66. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753. There has been debate about what exactly constitutes sufficient
“cause” to excuse a procedural default. See Daniel J. Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of Federal
Rights, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1128, 1148 (1986) (discussing how “[t]he lack of any definitive
elaboration of the meaning of cause . . . [has] resulted in considerable uncertainty, especially with
regard to whether or when unintentional defaults may constitute cause”).
67. Discussed infra Part II. See Meltzer, supra note 66, at 1149 (“The Supreme Court’s
discussion of the prejudice prong of the test has been no more illuminating.”). A number of courts
have utilized the Strickland standard to determine whether a petitioner has suffered “prejudice”
where the underlying claim is for ineffective-assistance-of-counsel. See, e.g., Robinson v. Ignacio,
360 F.3d 1044, 1054 (9th Cir. 2004) (“When conducting a ‘prejudice’ analysis in the context of
[overcoming a procedural default], this court applies the standard outlined in Strickland.”); Smith v.
Dixon, 14 F.3d 956, 976 (4th Cir. 1994) (noting that the court is “already required to conduct this
same [prejudicial impact] evaluation in the context of determining prejudice under Strickland and in
deciding whether to excuse Smith’s procedural default”); see also John C. Jeffries, Jr. & William J.
Stuntz, Ineffective Assistance and Procedural Default in Federal Habeas Corpus, 57 U. CHI. L.
REV. 679, 684 (1990) (describing how “habeas and Sixth Amendment doctrine converge, for both
require a showing of ‘prejudice’”); cf. Felder v. Johnson, 180 F.3d 206, 215 n.12 (5th Cir. 1999)
(mentioning that “without Strickland prejudice at a minimum, there is not even cause to overcome
the procedural bar”); United States v. Dale, 140 F.3d 1054, 1056 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“Circuit
precedent suggests that habeas prejudice may require a greater showing, namely, ‘by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the outcome of his trial would have been different but for the
errors in question.’” (internal citation omitted)); Zinzer v. Iowa, 60 F.3d 1296, 1299 n.7 (8th Cir.
1995) (“The ‘actual prejudice’ required to overcome the procedural bar must be a higher standard
than the Strickland prejudice required to establish the underlying claim for ineffective assistance of
counsel.”).
68. See Marceau, supra note 4, at 2092 (“Two of the most commonly raised claims by prisoners
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ineffective-assistance-of-counsel must satisfy the two-pronged test
mandated by Strickland v. Washington. 69 To demonstrate ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel, Strickland places the burden on the defendant to
show that “counsel’s performance was deficient” and that “the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense.” 70 As the Court concluded,
“[u]nless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the
conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary
process that renders the result unreliable.” 71
Under Strickland’s first prong, defense counsel is given a strong
presumption of having represented a client in an effective, and therefore
constitutional, manner. 72 Further, if a decision by defense counsel can be
characterized as one of legitimate trial strategy, counsel has not been
ineffective. 73 The Court held that, as part of the test for determining
whether defense counsel was ineffective, the reasonableness of counsel’s
actions should be judged based on the facts of the case at hand.74 This
standard is largely to discourage courts from engaging in “intrusive posttrial inquiry into attorney performance” and to “eliminate the distorting
effects of hindsight.” 75 This rationale makes sense because a subsequent
trial on effectiveness in every criminal case would impose an unbearable
burden on an already taxed criminal justice system. 76
To satisfy Strickland’s second prong, a petitioner must “affirmatively
prove prejudice.” 77 Strickland prejudice “requires showing that
counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair
trial.” 78 To show prejudice, a petitioner must demonstrate that “there is a
seeking federal habeas relief are Sixth Amendment claims pursuant to Strickland v. Washington and
due process claims based on Brady v. Maryland.”).
69. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
70. Id. at 687.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 689 (“Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential. It is all too
tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel’s assistance after conviction or adverse sentence,
and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel’s defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to
conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable.”).
73. See id.
74. Id. at 690.
75. Id. at 689–90.
76. See Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Drink, Drugs, and Drowsiness: The Constitutional Right to
Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Strickland Prejudice Requirement, 75 NEB. L. REV. 425,
439 (1996) (noting that critics of Strickland argue that “the strong deference given to a trial
counsel’s performance indicates the Court’s great concern for judicial economy and attorneys’
reputations”).
77. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693.
78. Id. at 687.
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reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.” 79 This standard
poses a tough challenge for petitioners to overcome. 80 A petitioner who
successfully alleges ineffective-assistance-of-counsel by demonstrating
both prongs is entitled to some form of relief, be it a re-trial or new
sentencing phase. 81 The Strickland two-pronged test is a critical element
of both decisions discussed in the following Part: Coleman v. Thompson
and Martinez v. Ryan.
III.

COLEMAN v. THOMPSON AND MARTINEZ v. RYAN: THE
INTERSECTION OF “CAUSE AND PREJUDICE” AND
INEFFECTIVE-ASSISTANCE-OF-COUNSEL

As this Comment focuses on Martinez v. Ryan and the changes to
“cause and prejudice” brought about by that decision, the opinion’s fourprongs will now be analyzed in detail. This Part will primarily concern
the first and second Martinez prongs. However, Martinez cannot be
understood without first looking at the decision it modified, Coleman v.
Thompson.
A.

Coleman v. Thompson: Barring Ineffective-Assistance-of-Counsel
from Constituting “Cause”

Coleman v. Thompson did more than merely lay out the “cause and
prejudice” test in an articulated form for lower federal courts. The
decision also barred a petitioner from using his counsel’s deficient
performance as “cause” to excuse a procedural default. 82 Roger Coleman
was convicted of rape and capital murder in the early 1980s. 83 After the
Virginia Court of Appeals upheld his conviction, Coleman filed a writ of
habeas corpus in Virginia state court alleging a variety of new federal
constitutional claims that he had not raised on direct appeal. 84 After
these claims were denied, Coleman failed to file a notice of appeal for
his habeas claims in a timely manner, missing the Virginia procedural
79. Id. at 694.
80. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010) (“Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is
never an easy task.”).
81. See, e.g., Crace v. Herzog, No. C12–5672 RBL/KLS, 2013 WL 3338498, at *6 (W.D. Wash.
July 2, 2013) (granting petitioner a writ of habeas corpus and ordering that the petitioner be released
unless the state elects to retry him within ninety days).
82. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753 (1991).
83. Id. at 726–27.
84. Id. at 727.
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deadline by three days. 85 Based on that oversight, the Virginia Supreme
Court dismissed the petition on appeal. 86 When attempting to raise these
same claims in a subsequent federal habeas petition, the district court
concluded that those grounds for relief were procedurally barred by the
state court’s earlier dismissal. 87
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Coleman asserted that
his attorney’s failure to timely file his state habeas appeal was a
sufficiently grievous error to constitute “cause” to excuse the procedural
default. 88 The Court rejected this argument, holding that “[a]ttorney
ignorance or inadvertence is not ‘cause’ because the attorney is the
petitioner’s agent when acting, or failing to act, in furtherance of the
litigation, and the petitioner must ‘bear the risk of attorney error.’” 89
Because an attorney acts on the petitioner’s behalf, the attorney’s errors
are not external to the petitioner. 90 As such, attorney error cannot
constitute “cause” for the procedural default.91 This result is problematic
because a petitioner’s potentially valid federal constitutional claims may
rest on the effectiveness of his representation. 92
B.

Martinez v. Ryan Creates a Narrow Exception to “Cause and
Prejudice”

In 2012, the Supreme Court created an exception to the Coleman
absolute bar: under limited circumstances, a petitioner can now
demonstrate “cause” through the deficient performance of his state PCR
counsel. 93 Luis Mariano Martinez was convicted of two counts of sexual
conduct with a minor in Arizona. 94 Arizona procedural law mandated
that petitioners bring IATC claims in a state PCR proceeding as opposed

85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 728.
88. Id. at 752.
89. Id. at 753.
90. See id.
91. See Inafuku, supra note 65, at 649 (noting that “[t]he attorney’s actions failed to meet the
‘cause’ standard because they were not instigated by a force external to the attorney”).
92. See id. at 652 (“The result in Coleman, however, is fundamentally unsettling.”). Roger
Coleman was executed on May 20, 1992 following the Supreme Court’s judgment and the Virginia
governor’s decision not to intervene. Peter Applebome, Virginia Executes Inmate Despite Claim of
Innocence, N.Y. TIMES (May 21, 1992), www.nytimes.com/1992/05/21/us/Virginia-executesinmate-despite-claim-of-innocence.html.
93. See Martinez v. Ryan, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012).
94. Id. at 1313.
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to doing so on direct appeal. 95 Although Martinez’s counsel did file a
state collateral review claim, counsel failed to raise any IATC grounds
for relief. 96 When Martinez eventually sought federal habeas relief in the
District Court for the District of Arizona, the court denied the IATC
claims because they were procedurally defaulted under Arizona law.97
As the Coleman rule controlled, Martinez was unable to show the
“cause” necessary to excuse his procedural default.98
The Supreme Court decided that it was “necessary to modify the
unqualified statement in Coleman that an attorney’s ignorance or
inadvertence in a postconviction proceeding does not qualify as cause to
excuse a procedural default.” 99 The Court held that litigating either pro
se or with appointed, yet ineffective, counsel during an initial state PCR
proceeding could constitute “cause” that would excuse a procedural
default. 100 The Court emphasized that, where initial review was in a state
PCR proceeding, no court would ever review the prisoner’s claims if
PCR counsel’s errors could not establish “cause.” 101 Even so, the
“Martinez gateway” can only be utilized to revive procedurally defaulted
IATC claims—other possible habeas grounds for relief remain barred. 102
This Section will first describe the Court’s rationale behind modifying
the Coleman rule. It will then analyze the four-pronged Martinez
standard by discussing how each element has been interpreted, with a
particular emphasis on the first and second Martinez prongs as those are
the primary focus of this Comment.
1.

The Supreme Court’s Rationale for Modifying the Coleman Bar

The Supreme Court addressed a number of issues concerning the
adjudication of IATC claims on direct appeal. First, writing for the
Court, Justice Kennedy recognized that “[i]neffective-assistance claims

95. Id. at 1314; see also State v. Spreitz, 39 P.3d 525, 527 (Ariz. 2002) (noting that “ineffective
assistance of counsel claims are to be brought in Rule 32 proceedings. Any such claims
improvidently raised in a direct appeal, henceforth, will not be addressed by appellate courts
regardless of merit.”).
96. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1314.
97. Id. at 1315 (noting that “the District Court denied the petition, ruling that Arizona’s
preclusion rule was an adequate and independent state-law ground to bar federal review”).
98. Id. at 1314.
99. Id. at 1315.
100. Id. at 1317.
101. Id. at 1316.
102. Id. at 1320 (“The rule of Coleman governs in all but the limited circumstances recognized
here. The holding in this case does not concern attorney errors in other kinds of proceedings . . . .”).
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often depend on evidence outside the trial record.” 103 Due to various
factors inherent in direct appeals, 104 the Court found that “there are
sound reasons for deferring consideration of ineffective-assistance-oftrial-counsel claims until the collateral review stage.” 105 The Court also
discussed the availability of state appointed counsel for collateral review
proceedings 106 and how, “[w]ithout the help of an adequate attorney, a
prisoner will have . . . difficulties vindicating a substantial ineffectiveassistance-of-trial-counsel claim.” 107
Second, the Court was concerned about the complexity of some state
procedural rules for untrained pro se petitioners. 108 As the Court noted,
“[w]hile confined to prison, the prisoner is in no position to develop the
evidentiary basis for a claim of ineffective assistance [of counsel], which
often turns on evidence outside the trial record.” 109 Further, Martinez
recognized that “[t]he prisoner, unlearned in the law, may not comply
with the State’s procedural rules or may misapprehend the substantive
details of federal constitutional law.” 110
Finally, the Court noted that ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims
differ from many other habeas grounds for relief often raised by
petitioners. 111 For example, defendants “cannot rely on a court opinion
or the prior work of an attorney addressing [the ineffective-assistanceof-counsel] claim.” 112 This means that pro se defendants are unable to
utilize prior attorney work product—leaving petitioners to figure out the
legal issues entirely on their own. Another issue concerns how
defendants may be forced to retain the same trial counsel for their direct
appeal. 113 As another commentator stated, “[t]his often places trial

103. Id. at 1318.
104. Id. (noting the difficulty of expanding the record given abbreviated deadlines).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1319.
107. Id. at 1317.
108. See id. at 1317.
109. Id.
110. Id.; see also Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 621 (2005) (discussing how “many
[criminal defendants] have learning disabilities and mental impairments”); Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543
U.S. 125, 140–41 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting how “[a] Department of Education study
found that about seven out of ten inmates fall in the lowest two out of five levels of literacy—
marked by an inability to do such basic tasks as write a brief letter to explain an error on a credit
card bill, use a bus schedule, or state in writing an argument made in a lengthy newspaper article.
An inmate so handicapped surely does not possess the skill necessary to pursue a competent pro se
appeal” (internal citation omitted)).
111. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1317.
112. Id.
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counsel in the untenable position of having to assert his own
ineffectiveness.” 114
The Court’s rationales in Martinez were similar to those in a prior
decision, Massaro v. United States. 115 While Massaro did not mandate
that IATC claims be reserved for collateral review, the Court did observe
that IATC claims may be more effectively adjudicated in that setting. 116
Joseph Massaro was indicted and convicted in the District Court for the
Southern District of New York for racketeering. 117 On direct appeal,
Massaro did not raise any claims relating to IATC. 118 When Massaro
later attempted to raise an IATC claim through a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, the district court found the claim procedurally defaulted
due to Massaro’s failure to raise it on direct appeal. 119
Massaro argued before the Supreme Court that “claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel need not be raised on direct appeal, whether or not
there is new counsel and whether or not the basis for the claim is
apparent from the trial record.” 120 A major point in the Court’s analysis
was that “[t]he trial record may contain no evidence of alleged errors of
omission, much less the reasons underlying them.” 121 The Court
continued
by
noting
that
“[w]ithout
additional
factual
development . . . an appellate court may not be able to ascertain whether
the alleged error was prejudicial.” 122 Once again writing for the Court,
Justice Kennedy specifically espoused the benefit of a reviewing court
hearing testimony from the allegedly deficient trial counsel. 123
The Court was concerned that not allowing these claims to be initially
raised during a PCR proceeding would “creat[e] the risk that defendants
would feel compelled to raise the issue before there had been an
113. See Eve B. Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 679, 711 (2007) (noting that “[a]lthough some
states have recognized the importance of new counsel, they do not make it a requirement”).
114. Id.
115. 538 U.S. 500 (2003).
116. See id. at 506.
117. Id. at 502.
118. Id. Massaro’s conviction was upheld on direct appeal by the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals. Id.
119. Id. Massaro does not directly control Martinez as Massaro filed his habeas petition
challenging a federal conviction, as opposed to a state conviction. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2255
(2012), with 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
120. Massaro, 538 U.S. at 503.
121. Id. at 505.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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opportunity fully to develop the factual predicate for the claim” and that
“the issue would be raised for the first time in a forum not best suited to
assess those facts.” 124 On direct appeal “appellate counsel and the court
must proceed on a trial record not developed precisely for the object of
litigating or preserving the claim and thus often incomplete or
inadequate.” 125 Without the benefit of an expanded record, “[e]ven
meritorious claims would fall when brought on direct appeal if the trial
record were inadequate to support them.” 126 The Court did not, however,
go so far as to hold that IATC claims must be reserved for collateral
review. 127 While Massaro dealt with IATC claims arising in the federal
system, the Supreme Court’s concerns were similar to those raised in
Martinez concerning state law.
2.

How to Pass Through the “Martinez Gateway”: The Supreme
Court’s Four-Pronged Standard

Following Martinez, the “cause” required to excuse a procedural
default can now be established where:
(1) the claim of “ineffective assistance of trial counsel” was a
“substantial” claim; (2) the “cause” consisted of there being “no
counsel” or only “ineffective” counsel during the state collateral
review proceeding; (3) the state collateral review proceeding
was the “initial” review proceeding in respect to the
“ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim”; and (4) state law
requires that an “ineffective assistance of trial counsel
[claim] . . . be raised in an initial-review collateral
proceeding.” 128
Meeting the four-pronged Martinez standard satisfies the “cause”
element of “cause and prejudice” to overcome a procedural default. 129
There is more debate about how Martinez affects the prejudice prong, an
issue that will be developed later in this Comment. 130
The first prong of Martinez requires a petitioner to “demonstrate that
the underlying ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim is a

124. Id. at 504.
125. Id. at 504–05.
126. Id. at 506.
127. Id. at 509.
128. Trevino v. Thaler, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1918 (2013) (emphasis and alterations in
original) (quoting Martinez v. Ryan, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1318–19, 1320–21 (2012)).
129. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318.
130. See infra Part V.
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substantial one, which is to say that the prisoner must demonstrate that
the claim has some merit.” 131 A petitioner must therefore present a
“substantial” showing of both Strickland “deficient performance” and
“actual prejudice” in order to satisfy the first prong. 132
However, Martinez is not clear about exactly what a “substantial”
IATC claim entails. Whatever “substantial” means, it certainly requires
something less than a full meritorious Strickland ineffective-assistanceof-counsel claim. 133 The Court used two different terms when discussing
the first prong: “some merit” and “substantial.” 134 While the Court has
given attorneys, judges, and pro se petitioners some guidance on how to
interpret these terms, 135 taken together the exact standard remains
unclear. This issue is further developed below. 136
There is an important difference between a Strickland claim with
“merit” and an IATC claim with “some merit.” A meritorious
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim satisfies the Strickland v.
Washington two-pronged test. 137 For example, the Ninth Circuit
approach when adjudicating ineffective-assistance-of-counsel directly
parrots Strickland v. Washington. 138 In Cook v. Ryan, 139 the court held
that “[a]n IAC [ineffective-assistance-of-counsel] claim has merit where
(1) counsel’s ‘performance was unreasonable under prevailing
professional standards,’ and (2) ‘there is a reasonable probability that but
for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result would have been
different.’” 140 This standard mirrors the familiar Strickland test for
evaluating ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. 141 Other circuits also
refer to “merit” when adjudicating a writ of habeas corpus based on

131. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318.
132. See id.
133. See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1738 (5th ed.
2011) (defining “substantial” as “[c]onsiderable in importance, value, degree, amount, or extent”);
Substantial, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/substantial?show=
0&t=1420508387 (last visited Feb. 13, 2015) (defining “substantial” as “being largely but not
wholly that which is specified”).
134. Id.
135. See id. at 1318–19 (citing Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003), as analogous support).
136. See infra Part IV.
137. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
138. See Cook v. Ryan, 688 F.3d 598, 610 (9th Cir. 2012).
139. 688 F.3d 598 (9th Cir. 2012)
140. Id. at 610 (emphasis added).
141. See, e.g., Hasan v. Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2001) (describing Strickland as a
“seminal decision”).
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ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. 142
The Supreme Court in Martinez, however, does not talk in terms of
“merit”; instead, it refers to “some merit.” 143 The Court cited Miller-El v.
Cockrell 144 as an analogous standard. 145 Miller-El concerned the denial
of a certificate of appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 2253. 146 Under
§ 2253(c)(1)(A), federal habeas petitioners challenging their state
conviction must obtain a certificate of appealability in order to appeal a
district court denial of habeas corpus to a Circuit Court of Appeals. 147
To merit a certificate of appealability under Miller-El, a petitioner
must demonstrate that “reasonable jurists could debate whether . . . the
petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the
issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed
further.” 148 The Miller-El standard is “demanding but not insatiable.” 149
A petitioner is not “require[d] . . . to prove . . . that some jurists would
grant the petition for habeas corpus”; a showing that “reasonable jurists
would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims
debatable or wrong” is sufficient. 150
The Court continued by describing the certificate of appealability
process as involving a “general assessment of [the claim’s] merits.” 151
Miller-El provided a number of different formulations of the certificate
of appealability standard including: (1) “‘something more that the
absence of frivolity’ or the existence of mere ‘good faith’ on his or her
part”; and (2) that “a claim can be debatable even though every jurist of
reason might agree . . . that petitioner will not prevail.” 152 Each phrase
demonstrates how the certificate of appealability standard lies
somewhere between frivolity and certain success. 153 “Some merit,”
therefore, as tied directly to the Miller-El certificate of appealability
standard, likely occupies this same middle ground. Subsequent lower

142. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Vaughn, 296 F.3d 138, 156 (3d Cir. 2002); Bertolotti v. Dugger, 883
F.2d 1503, 1520 (11th Cir. 1989).
143. Martinez v. Ryan, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1318 (2012).
144. 537 U.S. 322 (2003).
145. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1319.
146. Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 327 (2003).
147. 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (2012).
148. Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 336 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
149. Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240 (2005).
150. Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 338.
151. Id. at 336.
152. Id. at 338 (internal citations omitted).
153. See id.

13 - Ellis - final.docx (Do Not Delete)

2015]

A TALE OF THREE PREJUDICES

4/13/2015 11:59 AM

425

court decisions have taken the Court’s guidance seriously, often
applying the Miller-El standard when adjudicating the substantiality
prong. 154
Along with “some merit,” the Court used the term “substantial” when
articulating the first Martinez prong. 155 The Court explained that an
IATC claim would be “insubstantial” if it “does not have any merit or
that . . . is wholly without factual support.” 156 The Court used this phrase
when discussing how a state could defeat a petitioner’s Martinez motion
by answering that their IATC claim was “insubstantial” under the first
prong. 157 This Comment will later develop the definitional differences in
how the Court described the “substantial” language in the first prong. 158
In order to satisfy the second Martinez prong, a petitioner must show
that “the ‘cause’ consisted of there being ‘no counsel’ or only
‘ineffective’ counsel during the state collateral review proceeding.” 159 In
a situation where a petitioner filed pro se, “the second requirement is
satisfied simply by showing that the prisoner was not represented by
counsel during state PCR proceedings.” 160 This is logical because
otherwise Martinez would force a petitioner to demonstrate his own
deficient performance.
Strickland prejudice arises, however, when a petitioner was
represented by appointed counsel during the initial state PCR
proceeding. The second prong can be satisfied in this situation only
where “appointed counsel in the initial-review collateral
proceeding . . . was ineffective under the standards of Strickland v.
Washington.” 161 Petitioners must demonstrate that their PCR counsel
was ineffective and that PCR counsel’s performance actually prejudiced
the petitioner’s defense. 162 This Comment develops below exactly what
level of prejudice is required by the first and second prongs, in addition
154. Compare, e.g., Crutsinger v. Stephens, No. 12–70014, 2014 WL 3805464, at *7 (5th Cir.
Aug. 4, 2014) (“Crutsinger has failed to show that his underlying IAC [ineffective-assistance-ofcounsel] claim is substantial—that is, that it has ‘some merit.’”), with Cook v. Ryan, 688 F.3d 598,
610 n.13 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that “[i]n explaining that an underlying trial IAC [ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel] claim must have ‘some merit,’ Martinez referenced, not as direct but as
generally analogous support, Miller-El v. Cockrell”).
155. Martinez v. Ryan, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1318 (2012).
156. Id. at 1319.
157. See id.
158. See infra Part IV.A.1.
159. Trevino v. Thaler, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1918 (2013).
160. Detrich v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1237, 1245 (9th Cir. 2013).
161. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318.
162. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
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to the prejudice showing required by the “cause and prejudice” equitable
exception. 163
The third prong requires that the state PCR proceeding was the
“initial” review proceeding with respect to the IATC claim. 164 While the
“initial” nature of the proceeding was critical to the Supreme Court’s
concerns, 165 any further discussion is beyond the scope of this Comment.
To satisfy the fourth prong, petitioners must demonstrate that
Martinez applies to the state in which they were convicted.166 Unlike the
first three Martinez prongs, the fourth prong has undergone substantial
changes in the few years since Martinez was decided. 167 The fourth
prong is also the sole Martinez element that the Supreme Court has
addressed in a subsequent case. 168
When the Supreme Court decided Martinez, the fourth prong only
included states which “require[] a prisoner to raise an ineffectiveassistance-of-trial-counsel claim in a collateral proceeding.” 169 This was
the case in Martinez, as Arizona case law mandated that IATC claims be
reserved for state PCR proceedings. 170 The fourth prong concerns one of
the core ideas underlying Martinez: habeas petitioners should not be
unduly punished for the procedural quirks of the jurisdiction where they
were convicted. 171
States did not react positively to the Martinez decision. 172 Many
jurisdictions argued that their state’s procedural mechanisms could be

163. See infra Part V.
164. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318.
165. See id. (“It is within the context of this state procedural framework that counsel’s
ineffectiveness in an initial-review collateral proceeding qualifies as cause for a procedural
default.”).
166. Id.
167. See Trevino v. Thaler, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1921 (2013) (modifying the fourth
Martinez prong so that a petitioner may take advantage of Martinez where a state’s procedural
framework “makes it highly unlikely in a typical case that a defendant will have a meaningful
opportunity to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal”).
168. See generally id.
169. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318.
170. See State v. Spreitz, 39 P.3d 525, 527 (Ariz. 2002).
171. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1315, 1317; Eve Brensike Primus, Effective Trial Counsel After
Martinez v. Ryan: Focusing on the Adequacy of State Procedures, 122 YALE L.J. 2604, 2612 (2013)
(noting that the majority was “clearly concerned about precluding federal relief of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel claims when the state itself had created a procedural system that
effectively prevented defendants from having an opportunity to raise the claims in state court”).
172. See Primus, supra note 171, at 2618 (discussing how “[n]ot surprisingly, many states have
attempted to construe Martinez in ways that limit their post-conviction obligations”).
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distinguished from Arizona’s. 173 Other states argued that, as defendants
were not required to reserve ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims for
collateral review, Martinez was distinguishable and should not be
available to habeas petitioners challenging a conviction originating in
their state’s court system. 174 This led a large number of federal district
courts to reject the applicability of Martinez based on the procedural law
of the forum state. 175
173. States, for example, often successfully argued that Martinez was inapplicable where IATC
claims can be brought on direct appeal. See, e.g., Lyons v. Sinclair, No. C12-2216 RSM-BAT, 2014
WL 3055354, at *6 (W.D. Wash. July 7, 2014).
174. See Primus, supra note 171, at 2618 (noting how “[m]any states without an absolute
prohibition on raising ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims on direct appeal have seized on
this distinction to argue that Martinez does not apply to them”).
175. See, e.g., Dansby v. Norris, 682 F.3d 711, 729 (8th Cir. 2012) (“Martinez does not apply
here, because Arkansas does not bar a defendant from raising claims of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel on direct appeal.”), vacated by, Dansby v. Norris, 133 S. Ct. 2767; Arthur v. Thomas, No.
2:01-CV-0983-LSC, 2012 WL 2357919, at *9 (N.D. Ala. June 20, 2012) (“Alabama—unlike
Arizona—not only permitted such claims to be raised on direct appeal but provided a mechanism by
which Arthur was able to assert a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal.”);
Felix v. Cate, No. CV 11-7713-JHN (RNB), 2012 WL 2874398, at *10 (C.D. Cal. May 8, 2012)
(“California does not have a procedural rule requiring that all ineffective assistance of trial counsel
claims be raised by way of a collateral attack in a writ of habeas corpus, and not on direct appeal.”);
Tierney v. Abercrombie, No. 1:11-cv-00246 LEK-RLP, 2012 WL 3776487, at *4 (D. Haw. Aug.
29, 2012) (“Hawaii, unlike Arizona, does not require that a petitioner raise ineffective assistance of
trial counsel claims on collateral proceedings . . . .”); Weekly v. Hardy, No. 11 C 9231, 2012 WL
3916269, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 6, 2012) (“Weekly had an adequate opportunity under Illinois law to
raise his ineffective assistance of counsel claims and develop a record to use during his direct
appeal.”); Phillips v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, No. 3:11-CV-399-TLS, 2012 WL 6097019,
at *3 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 7, 2012) (“[T]he fact that the Indiana courts will entertain an attack on
competency of trial counsel in a direct appeal excludes Indiana from the Martinez exception . . . .”);
Foley v. White, No. 6:00-CV-552-DCR-REW, 2012 WL 6965070, at *4 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 15, 2012)
(“Kentucky still permits direct-appeal consideration. This is distinct from Arizona and renders
Martinez inapplicable by its own terms.”); Holmes v. Cooper, No. 12-1350, 2013 WL 694073, at
*10 (E.D. La. Jan. 22, 2013) (“Thus, under Louisiana law, direct appeal was Holmes’s initial
opportunity to raise his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel . . . .”); Buckingham v. Symmes,
No. 11-2489 (PJS/SER), 2012 WL 3612070, at *6 (D. Minn. May 15, 2012) (“Martinez is
inapplicable because Minnesota law permitted Buckingham to raise his ineffective assistance of trial
counsel claim for the first on direct appeal.”); Heidelberg v. King, No. 2:12cv112 KS-MTP, 2013
WL 4483234, at *6 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 19, 2013) (“Heidelberg was not required under Mississippi
law to bring his ineffective assistance claims in an initial-review collateral proceeding.”); Sheppard
v. Robinson, No 1:00-cv-493, 2012 WL 3583128, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 20, 2012) (“Ohio law
required Sheppard to raise his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim on direct appeal.”);
Fairchild v. Trammell, No. CIV-01-1550-D, 2013 WL 139777, at *4 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 10, 2013)
(“Because Oklahoma law permits defendants to raise trial counsel ineffectiveness claims on direct
appeal, the Martinez exception does not apply.”); Leberry v. Howerton, No. 3:10-00624, 2012 WL
2999775, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. July 23, 2012) (“In contrast [to Arizona], in Tennessee, ‘there is no
prohibition against litigation of ineffective counsel claims on direct appeal . . . .’” (internal citation
omitted)); Hearn v. Thaler, No. 3:12-CV-2140-D, 2012 WL 2715653, at *3 (N.D. Tex. July 9,
2012) (“Hearn acknowledges that his argument does not circumvent binding Fifth Circuit precedent
that the Martinez exception does not apply to Texas cases.”); Prokasky v. Glebe, No. C12-5134
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A 2013 Supreme Court decision, Trevino v. Thaler, 176 slightly
modified the fourth prong of Martinez in response to this widespread
dissention. 177 Trevino involved a federal habeas petitioner from Texas. 178
Unlike Arizona, Texas procedural law did not require petitioners to
reserve their IATC claims for state PCR proceedings. 179 However, due to
various elements of Texas’s appellate and PCR systems, 180 the Court
concluded that Texas law failed to afford meaningful review of IATC
claims on direct review. 181 The Court held that “a distinction between (1)
a State that denies permission to raise the claim on direct appeal and (2)
a State that in theory grants permission but, as a matter of procedural
design and systemic operation, denies a meaningful opportunity to do so
is a distinction without a difference.” 182 The new standard for the fourth
prong permits Martinez claims where direct review of IATC claims is
“virtually impossible” or “highly unlikely” to succeed, as opposed to
mandating that the defendant be “required” to reserve the claim for PCR
proceedings. 183
Many of the former holdout jurisdictions adopted the Martinez
exception following Trevino. 184 These federal district courts determined
BHS/KLS, 2012 WL 3877746, at *3 (W.D. Wash. June 11, 2012) (“Unlike the prisoner in Martinez,
Washington prisoners may raise claims alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct
review.”).
176. __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013).
177. See id. at 1921 (holding that Martinez applied in Texas as “[w]hat the Arizona law
prohibited by explicit terms, Texas law precludes as a matter of course”).
178. Id. at 1915.
179. See id. at 1918–19; Ibarra v. Thaler, 687 F.3d 222, 227 (5th Cir. 2012) (“Accordingly, Ibarra
is not entitled to the benefit of Martinez for his ineffectiveness claims, as Texas procedures entitled
him to review through counseled motions for new trial and direct appeal.”).
180. See, e.g., Robinson v. State, 16 S.W.3d 808, 810–11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (noting the
“many practical difficulties with requiring an appellant to claim ineffective assistance at the time of
trial or immediately post-trial” including that “there is not generally a realistic opportunity to
adequately develop the record for appeal in post-trial motions” and that “in most cases, the pursuit
of such a claim on direct appeal may be fruitless”); Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813–14 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1999) (“In the majority of instances, the record on direct appeal is simply undeveloped
and cannot adequately reflect the failings of trial counsel.”).
181. See Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1921 (determining that “we believe that the Texas procedural
system—as a matter of its structure, design, and operation—does not offer most defendants a
meaningful opportunity to present a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct
appeal”).
182. Id.
183. See id. at 1918, 1921.
184. See, e.g., Sasser v. Hobbs, 735 F.3d 833, 853 (8th Cir. 2013) (“For these reasons, we
conclude Arkansas did not ‘as a systematic matter’ afford Sasser ‘meaningful review of a claim of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel’ on direct appeal.” (internal citation omitted)); Brown v.
Thomas, No 2:11-CV-3578-RDP, 2013 WL 5934648, at *2 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 5, 2013) (“Therefore,
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that their forum states did not, as with Texas, afford meaningful review
of IATC claims on direct review, despite the fact that the claims could
be raised. 185
The adoption of Martinez following Trevino was by no means
universal, however. Illinois and Indiana federal district courts continue
to fully reject Martinez based on forum state procedural law. 186 Federal
district courts in Illinois have barred Martinez claims because state law
allows for the development of a record for appellants to make and
succeed upon IATC claims on direct appeal. 187 The few post-Trevino
cases from Indiana hold similarly: because defendants are allowed to
raise IATC claims either on direct appeal or in a PCR proceeding,
Martinez does not apply. 188
At least three other states have intradistrict or intrastate conflicting
opinions concerning the applicability of Martinez to federal habeas
petitioners: Ohio, 189 Tennessee, 190 and Washington. 191 The procedural
in line with Martinez and Trevino, it was proper for the Magistrate Judge to consider the merits of
the Mobley claim.”); Hughes v. Keith, No. 12-2841, 2014 WL 67587, at *11 (E.D. La. Jan. 8, 2014)
(“Based upon these similarities between Louisiana and Texas post-conviction procedures, it is likely
that Hughes could satisfy the 4th prong of the test for application of an exception under Martinez”).
185. See cases cited in note 184, supra.
186. See, e.g., Murphy v. Atchison, No. 12 C 3106, 2013 WL 4495652, at *22 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 19,
2013) (“Because of this critical difference between Illinois and Texas law, Trevino does not apply to
this case, as Murphy had a meaningful chance to raise an ineffective assistance of trial counsel
claim in his direct proceedings.”); Johnson v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, No. 3:12-CV-690TLS, 2013 WL 3989417, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 1, 2013) (“In Indiana, a claim that trial counsel was
ineffective can be raised either on direct appeal or in the post-conviction proceedings.”).
187. See People v. Phipps, 933 N.E.2d 1186, 1191 (Ill. 2010) (“In examining the factual basis, the
trial court must usually question trial counsel and the defendant on the alleged claims. Thus, the
basis for a possible ineffective assistance claim will ordinarily appear in the record.” (internal
citation omitted)); People v. Banks, 934 N.E.2d 435, 468 (Ill. 2010) (“The law is clear, however,
that new counsel is not required in every case, and that the operative concern for a reviewing court
is whether the trial court conducted an adequate inquiry into the pro se defendant’s claim of
ineffective assistance.”); People v. Krankel, 464 N.E.2d 1045, 1049 (Ill. 1984) (holding that
defendant should have received appointed counsel other than his originally appointed counsel
concerning his motion for a new trial based on the ineffectiveness of his trial counsel).
188. See Johnson, 2013 WL 3989417, at *1; Brown v. Superintendent, No. 3:10-CV-518, 2014
WL 495400, at *9, (N.D. Ind. Feb. 6, 2014) (“Indiana law allows (and in some instances, requires)
ineffective assistance claims to be raised on direct appeal.”).
189. Compare Landrum v. Anderson, No. 1:96-cv-641, 2014 WL 1576869, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Apr.
18, 2014) (“Thus the applicability of Martinez and Trevino to Ohio post-conviction proceedings
remains unclear.”), with Raglin v. Mitchell, No. 1:00cv767, 2013 WL 5468227, at *7 (S.D. Ohio
Sept. 29, 2013) (“This Court has found that the Martinez exception applies to ‘a case where,
because of the way Ohio post-conviction review law is structured, the ineffective assistance of trial
counsel claim has to be brought in post-conviction.’” (internal citation omitted)).
190. Compare Rahman v. Carpenter, No. 3:96-0380, 2013 WL 3865071, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. July
25, 2013) (“This Court is persuaded that the Tennessee courts offer a meaningful opportunity for
defendants to raise ineffective assistance claims during the direct appeal process, and therefore, the
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systems in place for each of these three forum states makes it a much
closer call whether Martinez would apply post-Trevino. 192 Although the
“Martinez gateway” is not available to federal habeas petitioners
challenging convictions from all fifty states, further discussion of the
fourth Martinez prong is beyond the scope of this Comment. 193
IV.

STRICKLAND AND SUBSTANTIALITY: A TROUBLED
PAIRING

Martinez v. Ryan mandates that a reviewing district court make an
initial determination as to the “substantial” nature of a habeas
petitioner’s IATC ground for relief. 194 In order to satisfy this first prong,
“a prisoner must . . . demonstrate that the underlying ineffectiveassistance-of-trial-counsel claim is a substantial one, which is to say that
the prisoner must demonstrate that the claim has some merit.” 195 This
Part explores the first Martinez prong and offers recommendations for
alleviating a number of concerns that arise out of the “substantiality”
standard.
This Part first analyzes two tensions that complicate a “substantiality”
analysis under the first prong. One tension comes from the language

decisions in Martinez/Trevino do not apply to the Tennessee courts.”), with Morrow v. Brandon,
No. 3:06-0955, 2014 WL 49817, at *9 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 7, 2014) (holding that “Tennessee’s system
by ‘design and operation makes it highly unlikely in a typical case that a defendant will have a
meaningful opportunity to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal.’”
(internal citation omitted)). The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has recently held that Martinez in
fact applies in Tennessee. See Sutton v. Carpenter, 745 F.3d 787, 792 (6th Cir. 2014) (mentioning
that “like Texas, Tennessee’s procedural rules make it almost impossible for a defendant in a typical
case to adequately present an ineffective-assistance claim on direct appeal”).
191. Compare Lyons v. Sinclair, No. C12-2216 RSM-BAT, 2014 WL 3055354, at *6 (W.D.
Wash. July 7, 2014) (“Martinez is inapplicable, however, because in Washington State ineffective
assistance clams can be brought on direct appeal.”), with Weber v. Sinclair, No. C08-1676RSL,
2014 WL 1671508, at *8 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 28, 2014) (“This Court therefore finds that, since direct
appeal is not the appropriate venue for reviewing evidence outside the record in Washington,
petitioner was denied a ‘meaningful opportunity to present a claim ineffective assistance of trial
counsel on direct appeal’ . . . .” (internal citation omitted)).
192. See, e.g., State v. McFarland, 127 Wash. 2d 322, 338 n.5, 899 P.2d 1251, 1258 n.5 (1995)
(noting that “[t]here is nothing intrinsic in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel that requires it
to be considered only in a collateral proceeding such as a personal restraint petition. We regularly
consider such claims on direct appeal”).
193. For more information see generally Mary Dewey, Martinez v. Ryan: A Shift Toward
Broadening Access to Federal Habeas Corpus, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 269 (2012); Devon Lash,
Giving Meaning to “Meaningful Enough”: Why Trevino Requires New Counsel on Appeal, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 1855 (2014); Primus, supra note 171.
194. Martinez v. Ryan, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1318 (2012).
195. Id.
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utilized by the Court in Martinez—the varying definitions for “some
merit” and “substantial” are not coextensive, despite the reference to the
Miller-El v. Cockrell certificate of appealability standard. 196 The other
tension arises from Strickland itself—the two pronged test for
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel does not lend itself to such a
“substantial” analysis. 197 Then, this Part offers a solution to alleviate
these tensions. Federal district courts should apply the lower standard for
finding a “substantial” IATC claim under the first prong, allowing more
petitioners through the “Martinez gateway.”
A.

Tensions Inherent in the Martinez “Substantiality” Determination

While Martinez includes a number of guideposts for petitioners
attempting to navigate the first prong, 198 the language is at times
conflicting. This conflict creates tension between the Miller-El
certificate of appealability standard—“some merit”—and, in particular,
the definition provided for “insubstantial.” 199 Further tensions arise
because of the incorporation of Strickland v. Washington. 200 The twopronged ineffective-assistance-of-counsel test does not easily adapt to a
“substantial” version as required by the Martinez first prong.
1.

“Some Merit” Versus “Substantial”: Varying Definitions Confuse
the Standard

There are inherent difficulties for determining whether an IATC claim
is “substantial” for the purposes of the first prong of Martinez. Based
solely on the dictionary, the word “substantial” is a relatively close
synonym for what the Supreme Court was trying to convey through the
term “some merit.” 201 Both terms imply something less than a whole yet

196. See infra Part IV.A.1.
197. See infra Part IV.A.2.
198. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318–19.
199. See id.
200. See id. at 1318 (incorporating the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel standard from Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)).
201. See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra note 133, at
1668 (defining “some” as “[b]eing a portion or an unspecified number or quantity of a whole or
group”); id. at 1738 (defining “substantial” as “[c]onsiderable in importance, value, degree, amount,
or extent”); Some, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/some (last
visited Feb. 13, 2015) (defining “some” as “being at least one—used to indicate that a logical
proposition is asserted only of a subclass or certain members of the class denoted by the term which
it modifies”); Substantial, supra note 133 (defining “substantial” as “being largely but not wholly
that which is specified.”).
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more than nothing at all. Martinez, however, muddies the water by
providing lower courts with a contrary version of “substantial” through
the definition of “insubstantial.” 202 This results in multiple conflicting
standards that are not analogous—”insubstantial” and “some merit.” The
former creates a lower burden than the latter.
As discussed above, Martinez provided a number of guideposts by
which a lower court could interpret “substantial.” One was the Miller-El
v. Cockrell standard for a certificate of appealability. 203 This test, in
essence, requires a court to find that reasonable jurists could find the
outcome on a petitioner’s grounds for relief debatable. 204 The Court also
described “substantial” in terms of “some merit.” 205 Finally, and most
importantly, Martinez defined “insubstantial” as a claim without “any
merit or that . . . is wholly without factual support.” 206 As that phrase
defines “insubstantial,” one can assume that a claim not meeting these
criteria would be deemed “substantial.” 207
These conflicting phrases provide competing definitions for what
constitutes a “substantial” claim. In fact, due to the far lower burden
imposed by “insubstantial,” they are relatively incompatible. “Wholly
without factual support” is very different from “some merit” as defined
by the Miller-El certificate of appealability standard. While “some
merit” demands a lesser showing than that required to directly grant a
writ of habeas corpus under Strickland, the definition of “insubstantial”
appears to require much less—namely, that any level of factual support
or “merit” a petitioner can muster may satisfy the standard for a
“substantial” IATC claim.
2.

Problems Concerning “Substantial” Strickland IATC Claims
Prior to Expanding the Record

As discussed above, the Strickland standard presumes that defense
counsel was effective. 208 The onus is therefore on the petitioner to
overcome that presumption 209—a difficult task when courts view

202. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1319.
203. See id. at 1318–19.
204. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003).
205. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318.
206. Id. at 1319.
207. Insubstantial, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/insubstantial
(last visited Feb. 13, 2015) (defining “insubstantial” as “not substantial”).
208. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984).
209. See id.
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counsel’s actions and decisions deferentially. 210 But how does a district
court account for this presumption when adjudicating “substantiality”
under Martinez? Are judges supposed to factor in the possibility (or
probability as the case may be) that counsel was acting within
reasonable bounds during the trial when the court makes its
“substantiality” determination? If reasonable actions by counsel equal a
meritless ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, how is “some merit”
measured? Further, discovery and an expanded record are generally
necessary to properly adjudicate IATC claims. 211 Is a district court
supposed to make a determination on reasonableness before the record
has been expanded to include testimony concerning a defense counsel’s
actions during the trial? It is not at all clear how the presumption that
counsel was effective fits into the “substantial” Strickland finding
required by Martinez.
As part of the process for adjudicating ineffective-assistance-ofcounsel claims in the federal system, trial defense counsel often either
testifies or submits some writing explaining any alleged deficiencies in
his performance. 212 This makes sense: how else is the court to determine
whether a certain action was legitimate trial strategy without input from
the defense counsel who made those decisions? Although many actions
taken by counsel fall under this umbrella, a court cannot be sure when
undertaking a preliminary “substantiality” inquiry without an expanded
record. This determination requires input from trial counsel explaining
their actions, preferably through live testimony subject to crossexamination. 213
The Supreme Court addressed a similar issue in Massaro v. United
States. 214 Although Massaro involved a habeas petition arising out of a
federal conviction, 215 the Court’s reasoning speaks to the same issues as
Martinez. The Court in Massaro was also troubled by the lack of an
expanded record when adjudicating IATC claims on direct appeal. 216
Among other factors, the Court found that the opportunity to hear

210. See id.
211. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318.
212. See, e.g., Buss v. Primo, Civil No. 6:12–cv–01539–BR, 2014 WL 3817228, at *5–6 (D. Or.
July 31, 2014) (counsel explained actions in an affidavit); Richardson v. United States, No. C13–
373RSL, 2014 WL 2115468, at *4 (W.D. Wash. May 21, 2014) (counsel explained in a declaration
why certain strategic decisions were made).
213. See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 505 (2003).
214. 538 U.S. 500 (2003).
215. Id. at 502.
216. Id. at 505.
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testimony from trial counsel was key to the fair resolution of IATC
claims. 217
B.

Applying a Lower “Substantiality” Standard Coupled with an
Increase in Evidentiary Hearings Would Resolve these Tensions

Neither of the tensions surrounding the Martinez “substantiality”
determination has an easy fix. The former is bogged down by the
presence of multiple, conflicting tests from the opinion’s language. The
latter is a fundamental problem when mandating a lessened
demonstration of the two-pronged ineffective-assistance-of-counsel test
as Strickland, due to presumption of effectiveness, does not lend itself to
such a reduced showing.
This Comment offers two suggestions for relieving these tensions.
The first Section below argues that, due to the conflicting language,
federal courts should apply the lower showing required by the Supreme
Court’s definition of “insubstantial.” This issue will likely only be
alleviated through a new Supreme Court opinion clarifying exactly what
showing is required for a “substantial” Strickland claim. The second
Section argues that, as IATC claims generally rely on evidence outside
the trial record, district courts should conduct more evidentiary hearings,
so the courts can get input from the trial defense counsel. This hearing
would take place when the petitioner has already been allowed through
the “Martinez gateway.” These suggestions would allow more claims
through the “Martinez gateway,” providing more habeas petitioners their
day in court.
1.

Courts Should Apply the Supreme Court’s Definition for
“Insubstantial” When Adjudicating the First Prong

Due to the conflicting definitions in Martinez, courts should apply the
lower “insubstantial” language when adjudicating the first prong. Until
the Supreme Court clarifies the issue, this results in the fairest outcome
for habeas petitioners. While most courts entertaining Martinez motions
have relied on the Court’s reference to Miller-El and applied the
certificate of appealability test,218 the difference in language between
Miller-El and Martinez suggests that approach is inappropriate. Based on
the definition of “insubstantial” later in Martinez, any factual basis

217. Id.
218. See, e.g., Lutz v. Valeska, No. 1:10cv950–TMH, 2014 WL 868870, at *4 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 5,
2014).
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should technically be sufficient to constitute a substantial IATC claim.
While the Supreme Court likely preferred the higher Miller-El
standard, 219 the confusion in language should be read in the petitioner’s
favor to allow more claims to satisfy the first prong. 220 Applying a lower
standard would make Martinez clearer for petitioners either unfamiliar
with habeas law or representing themselves pro se. A lower standard
should be used until the Supreme Court provides some clarification,
even in the form of an opinion reaffirming the use of the Miller-El
certificate of appealability standard.
2. Federal District Courts Should Allow More Petitioners Through the
“Martinez Gateway” and Hold More Evidentiary Hearings on the
Underlying IATC Claims
The tension between Strickland and “substantiality” is more difficult
to resolve. Due to the difficulty in adjudicating IATC claims without an
expanded record, this Comment argues that more habeas petitions
raising Martinez should be deemed “substantial” and allowed to proceed
to an evidentiary hearing. Because Martinez mentioned both the
possibility and utility of evidentiary hearings, 221 lower courts should
employ such measures where appropriate.
a.

An Expanded Record Is Often Required to Determine Whether a
Petitioner Has Raised a Meritorious IATC Claim

When determining whether a petitioner has alleged a “substantial”
IATC claim, a federal district court will likely require an expanded
record to include testimony from the petitioner’s trial defense counsel.
Although counsel is presumed to have acted competently, 222 a judge
cannot determine whether this presumption has or can be overcome
without hearing from defense counsel herself. To examine this issue
further, compare the following hypothetical exchange (concerning an
allegation of failure to investigate potential alibi witnesses) between trial
defense counsel and the petitioner’s federal habeas counsel during an
evidentiary hearing:
Q: Counsel, why did you fail to investigate, find, and interview
219. See Martinez v. Ryan, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1318–19 (2012) (specifically citing
Miller-El as an analogous standard).
220. Cf. United States v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203, 210 (1970) (describing that, in contract law, it
is a “general maxim that a contract should be construed most strongly against the drafter”).
221. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318.
222. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984).
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witness X who could have potentially supported petitioner’s
alibi defense?
A: Unfortunately, the police report only listed the individual by
his first name and contained no information concerning an
address or phone number at which witness X could be contacted.
Further, I did not believe that petitioner’s alibi defense was
credible or would resonate with a jury. I therefore chose to focus
on other strategies to undermine the prosecution’s case.
Counsel’s answer likely fits within the scope of Strickland’s required
deference—defense counsel has explained why the omission occurred as
well as how it can legitimately be considered within the bounds of a
reasonable trial strategy. 223 The court does not have to agree with trial
counsel’s decision under Strickland—the decision need only be
reasonable. 224 Now consider the following alternate answer:
Q: Counsel, why did you fail to investigate, find, and interview
witness X who could have potentially supported petitioner’s
alibi defense?
A: Well, I asked petitioner if he knew who witness X was and
where I could contact him. Petitioner informed me of his
whereabouts and added that X could substantiate his alibi that he
had not been on the scene when the crime occurred. However, I
did not contact witness X because I was busy with my other
cases.
This answer seems more problematic under Strickland. Instead of
describing a decision reached as part of a reasonable trial strategy,
counsel here has merely decided that he did not have time to fully
investigate the leads he was given by the petitioner. As such, this
omission is much closer to a failure to investigate—something that could
be unreasonable under Strickland and therefore constitute ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel. 225
The difference between the two scenarios above is critical to a
Strickland analysis—the first is unlikely to constitute IATC while the
latter potentially supports a colorable claim. 226 However, unless the
223. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 907 F.2d 994, 999 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that the
attorney “cannot be held responsible for [the defendant’s] failure to inform him of the full import
and breadth of his symptoms and claimed incapacities, especially where some aspects lay beyond
the scope of reasonable investigation”).
224. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–89.
225. See, e.g., James v. Ryan, 679 F.3d 780, 807–10 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated on other grounds,
133 S. Ct. 1579 (2013) (finding deficient performance for “fail[ing] to conduct even the most basic
investigation of James’s social history”).
226. See, e.g., id.
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record is somehow expanded to include testimony from the trial defense
counsel, a district court judge cannot know what kind of answer trial
counsel will give in response to a petitioner’s allegations. Although it
may be (and likely is) far more probable that trial counsel will give an
answer that falls within the bounds of reasonable trial strategy, the court
cannot know this for sure without additional information and an
expanded record. Judges should therefore not dismiss a petitioner’s
allegations out-of-hand without an expanded record. Courts should
instead proceed to an evidentiary hearing on the underlying IATC issue.
To do otherwise would deny a federal habeas petitioner the potential for
relief granted by the Supreme Court in Martinez.
b.

Evidentiary Hearings Should Be Held After Progressing Through
the “Martinez Gateway”

Weber v. Sinclair 227 is as an example of a district court granting an
evidentiary hearing after allowing a petitioner through the “Martinez
gateway.” 228 In Weber, the federal district court was presented with a list
of allegations concerning the ineffectiveness of petitioner’s trial
counsel. 229 These alleged errors included various omissions and
elements of trial strategy, including the failure to investigate witnesses
and identity-focused defenses. 230 The court granted the hearing, finding
that “[i]n order to determine whether these allegations constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel, a court would need further evidence
from outside the record that explains the trial-attorney’s strategy and
omissions, the reasons behind these decisions, and how or why such
decisions were prejudicial to petitioner.” 231
The evidentiary hearing allowed Weber to expand the record. Weber
was able to call his own witnesses, including his trial defense counsel.232
As an example, Weber had alleged that his counsel rendered ineffective
227. No. C08–1676RSL, 2014 WL 1671508 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 28, 2014).
228. See id. at *10.
229. Id. at *8.
230. Id. These allegations included the failure to investigate the party where the alleged crime
occurred, the failure to interview actual and potential witnesses,
failure to consider evidence of the shooter’s shaved head compared to the defendant’s
haircut, . . . failure to adequately cross-examine and impeach the victim on the identification of
the shooter, . . . failure to present evidence that an area code tattoo is common, and failure to
present evidence that the nickname ‘Guero Loco’ is common.
Id.
231. Id.
232. Evidentiary Hearing, Weber v. Sinclair, No. C08-1676RSL (W.D. Wash.), Sept. 29, 2014,
Seattle Courtroom 15106.

13 - Ellis - final.docx (Do Not Delete)

438

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

4/13/2015 11:59 AM

[Vol. 90:405

assistance by failing to adequately challenge the identity of the
perpetrator as part of Weber’s purported alibi defense. 233 During the
hearing, defense counsel was asked why he failed to use the word “alibi”
during closing argument. 234 Counsel responded by stating that, in his
opinion, juries considered “alibi” to be a dirty word that indicated a
defendant was attempting to use some excuse to escape punishment.235
Whatever the outcome, Weber was able to adjudicate his claim based on
a more complete record that included testimony from his trial counsel
about counsel’s explanation for the alleged deficiencies.
c.

AEDPA Does Not Bar Such Evidentiary Hearings

Although AEDPA made evidentiary hearings for state habeas
petitioners hard to come by, 236 a hearing such as the one in Weber should
satisfy both Martinez and 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). Motions to pass
through the “Martinez gateway” are only made in cases where a mistake
has been made that resulted in a procedural default. These claims have
therefore never been adjudicated on the merits in state court. As such,
another often implicated AEDPA section, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), has no
application under Martinez. 237 There is often no available mechanism to
immediately expand the trial court record. 238 This makes IATC claims
extremely difficult if not impossible to prove on direct review. 239
While § 2254(e)(2) has a number of provisions that a petitioner could
utilize to gain an evidentiary hearing, the one most relevant to a
Martinez claim is § 2254(e)(2)(A)(ii) which states that “the court shall
not hold an evidentiary hearing on [the claim without the necessary
factual basis] unless the applicant shows that . . . the claim relies on . . . a

233. Weber, 2014 WL 1671508, at *8.
234. Evidentiary Hearing, Weber v. Sinclair, No. C08-1676RSL (W.D. Wash.), Sept. 29, 2014,
Seattle Courtroom 15106.
235. Id.
236. See supra Part I.B (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (2012)).
237. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Section 2254(d) does not bar either an evidentiary hearing or the
expansion of the trial record with new, relevant information. See Dickens v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1302,
1320 (9th Cir. 2014) (determining that the Cullen v. Pinholster, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011),
holding barring evidence not presented in state court has no application to claims not previously
adjudicated on the merits in that state court); Marceau, supra note 4, at 2143 (“Martinez permits the
prisoner to: (a) overcome the procedural default; and (b) avoid the strictures of § 2254(d) and,
therefore, . . . Pinholster.”).
238. Martinez v. Ryan, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1318 (2012) (noting that “[a]bbreviated
deadlines to expand the record on direct appeal may not allow adequate time for an attorney to
investigate the ineffective-assistance claim”).
239. See id.
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factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered through
the exercise of due diligence.” 240 This provision has been strictly
construed and is interpreted as having a narrow scope. 241
Section 2254(e)(2)(A)(ii), however, does not take into account the
peculiar situation in which Martinez is raised. In such circumstances, the
petitioner’s attorney was ineffective at the time the ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claim should have been raised, leading to
procedural default of that claim. Under § 2254(e)(2), “[a] petitioner’s
attorney’s ‘fault’ is generally attributed to the petitioner for purposes of
§ 2254(e)(2)’s diligence requirement.” 242 This very idea, however, was a
major distinguishing point between Coleman and Martinez. 243 Because
the Supreme Court made this distinction for Martinez claims, it seems
likely the same principle would apply to holding an evidentiary hearing
on a claim that was permitted to pass through the “Martinez gateway.”
This conclusion is buttressed by the Supreme Court’s own discussion of
the importance of expanded records when adjudicating IATC claims. 244
It would be illogical for the Court to allow a petitioner to resuscitate his
IATC claim and expound on how vital an expanded record is to the
adjudication of such claims, only to bar the one procedure that can
actually enable this result. 245 Evidentiary hearings have, however, been
denied by the majority of district courts reviewing Martinez claims. 246
240. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(A)(ii) (2012).
241. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 437 (2000) (“For state courts to have their rightful
opportunity to adjudicate federal rights, the prisoner must be diligent in developing the record and
presenting, if possible, all claims of constitutional error. If the prisoner fails to do so, himself or
herself contributing to the absence of a full and fair adjudication in state court, § 2254(e)(2)
prohibits an evidentiary hearing to develop the relevant claims in federal court, unless the statute’s
other stringent requirements are met. . . . Yet comity is not served by saying a prisoner ‘has failed to
develop the factual basis of a claim’ where he was unable to develop his claim in state court despite
diligent effort.”).
242. Dickens, 740 F.3d at 1321.
243. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1316. The Court noted that although “Coleman held that
‘[n]egligence on the part of a prisoner’s post-conviction attorney does not qualify as ‘cause,’’”
“Coleman . . . did not present the occasion to apply this principle to determine whether attorney
errors in initial-review collateral proceedings may qualify as cause for a procedural default.” Id. The
Court distinguished Coleman as “[t]he alleged failure of counsel in Coleman was on appeal from an
initial-review collateral proceeding, and in that proceeding the prisoner’s claims had been addressed
by the state habeas trial court.” Id.
244. See id. at 1318 (“Ineffective-assistance claims often depend on evidence outside the trial
record.”).
245. See Marceau, supra note 4, at 2163–64 (“Because the inability to develop a factual record on
habeas would prove fatal to most [ineffective-assistance-of-counsel] claims, reading § 2254(e)(2) as
trumping Martinez would be a substantial death-knell to the full and fair model of habeas
adjudication.”).
246. See, e.g., Fielder v. Stevenson, No. 2:12-cv-00412-JMC, 2013 WL 593657, at *4 (D.S.C.
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The Ninth Circuit has formulated a different answer to the inherent
problems between § 2254(e)(2) and Martinez. In Dickens v. Ryan 247 the
court found that, although § 2254(e)(2) would bar the petitioner from
introducing new evidence to the district court, the statute would not bar
an evidentiary hearing limited to the determination of “cause.” 248 The
court reasoned the language of § 2254(e)(2) limits the provision’s scope
to “claim[s].” 249 It followed that, because a “cause” determination is not
a claim, a district court can hold an evidentiary hearing on that issue
without heeding the strict guidelines of § 2254(e)(2). 250 The Ninth
Circuit had previously recognized that a petitioner would have to satisfy
the diligence requirement of § 2254(e)(2) in order to receive an
evidentiary hearing on the merits.251 Alternatively, § 2254(e)(2) may not
apply to claims where a procedural default has been excused.252
The Ninth Circuit approach, while potentially more in line with the
statutory standard, 253 seems like a work-around of the AEDPA scheme.
The district court would have two unsatisfying options. The court could
hold an evidentiary hearing limited strictly to “cause”—an approach that
would not do a petitioner much good when it came to adjudicating the
merits of his IATC claim. Or the district court could hold a hearing on
“cause” and expand the record sufficiently to later adjudicate the
underlying claim on the merits. Neither of these options is particularly
appealing. The former would be largely pointless because petitioners,
while potentially being able to show “cause,” would nonetheless by
unable to expand the record sufficiently to prove their underlying IATC
grounds for relief. The latter, when viewed through a cynical lens, is
basically an attempt to avoid application of § 2254(e)(2).
Feb. 14, 2013) (noting that “Martinez does not directly provide the authority for a petitioner to
expand the record in order to further develop facts that could have been presented in the state court
proceeding”).
247. 740 F.3d 1302 (2014).
248. Id. at 1321.
249. Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (2012).
250. Dickens, 740 F.3d at 1321.
251. See Stokley v. Ryan, 659 F.3d 802, 809 (9th Cir. 2011).
252. See Dickens, 740 F.3d at 1321 (“However, if Dickens can show cause and prejudice to
excuse a procedural default, AEDPA no longer applies and a federal court may hear this new claim
de novo.”). But see Habeas Relief for State Prisoners, 40 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 931,
954 n.2795 (2011) (noting that “[e]ven if the federal court is able to address the defaulted claim, it
must . . . have a factual basis developed on the record, as an evidentiary hearing may be unavailable
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)”). There is however no textual exception in § 2254(e)(2).
253. See Dickens, 740 F.3d at 1321 (noting that, under § 2254(e)(2)(A)(ii), “[w]hen a petitioner
seeks to show ‘cause’ based on ineffective assistance of PCR counsel, he is not asserting a ‘claim’
for relief as that term is used in § 2254(e)(2)”).
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More Evidentiary Hearings Would Allow More IATC Claims To
Be Adjudicated on the Merits

There has so far been little sign of evidentiary hearings being granted
in Martinez cases. 254 Without an expanded record, however much a
claim may appear to fit within the bounds of counsel’s trial strategy or
some other reasonable attorney conduct, any evidence to the contrary is
often not before the judge. A hearing is required to hear testimony from
the trial attorney to figure out exactly why the challenged decisions were
made. The evidentiary hearing in Weber and future cases should
comport with the requirements placed on district courts by § 2254(e)(2)
when viewed through the lens of the Martinez decision.
Although this hearing could also be granted to determine whether a
petitioner has met the burden for “cause,” it seems more productive for a
district court to make the “substantiality” determination and then
proceed to the merits. The evidentiary hearing would then take place
under circumstances where the district court could grant relief if the
underlying IATC claim was meritorious. Even if the habeas ground for
relief is denied, petitioners would still have been granted their day in
court and would finally have had their IATC claims adjudicated on the
merits based on an adequate record. Petitioners could also raise valid
IATC claims through the “Martinez gateway”—a scenario that the
Supreme Court must have believed possible when it decided Martinez.
Due to both the conflicting language and inherent tension with
Strickland, lower federal courts should be applying the lowest
“substantial” definition from Martinez, that for an “insubstantial” IATC
claim. Based on that lessened standard, those courts should then allow
more petitioners through the “Martinez gateway” and on to evidentiary
hearings addressing their underlying claims.
V.

A TALE OF THREE PREJUDICES: ALL THREE SHOULD BE
ANALYZED UNDER THE SAME STANDARD

The Martinez four-pronged test requires a court to potentially make
two different determinations of prejudice before granting equitable relief
for a procedurally defaulted claim. Under Martinez, a finding of
254. See King, supra note 18, at 2434 (noting that “even though it is within a judge’s discretion to
permit a petitioner to develop new facts for claims dismissed rather than denied in state court,
federal judges after Martinez continue to deny IATC claims on their merits and without hearings
when the petitioner was not diligent in developing the record in state court”); Primus, supra note
171, at 2616 (noting that “it remains to be seen how readily available federal evidentiary hearings
will be to address these claims”).
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prejudice is required for: (1) the “substantiality” determination in the
first prong, and (2) whether state PCR counsel was deficient in the
second prong. 255 As Judge Nguyen’s concurrence in Detrich v. Ryan 256
correctly notes, Martinez only explicitly creates an exception for
“cause”—the opinion does not on its face modify the required Coleman
prejudice determination. 257 The district court, therefore, must also make
a third prejudice finding which satisfies the prejudice element of the
“cause and prejudice” equitable exception. 258
The first Martinez prong requires the court to find that a petitioner’s
IATC claim is “substantial.” 259 This initial showing mandates that a
petitioner make a “substantial” showing of both Strickland elements for
establishing ineffective-assistance-of-counsel—deficient performance
and “actual prejudice.” 260 The second prejudice determination must be
made if petitioners were represented by appointed counsel during their
initial state PCR proceedings. 261 As the second Martinez prong indicates,
petitioner’s state PCR counsel must have been “ineffective.” 262 This
requires another Strickland showing of deficient performance and
“actual prejudice.” 263 As the prejudice element of the second Martinez
prong is only applicable to cases where a petitioner was actually
represented by counsel, petitioners proceeding pro se are spared the
burden of meeting Strickland here. 264 The third prejudice showing is that
required to satisfy the “cause and prejudice” equitable exception.265
255. See Martinez v. Ryan, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1318 (2012).
256. 740 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 2013).
257. See id. at 1260 (9th Cir. 2013) (Nguyen, J., concurring) (noting that “Martinez does not
address—let alone modify—the [cause and prejudice] standard’s prejudice prong”). The Martinez
four pronged test allows “a prisoner [to] establish cause to excuse a procedural default.” See
Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318.
258. See Detrich, 740 F.3d at 1260 (Nguyen, J., concurring) (“The Supreme Court left no doubt
that Coleman’s cause-and-prejudice standard applies ‘[i]n all cases in which a state prisoner has
defaulted his federal claims in state court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural
rule.’ Martinez does not address—let alone modify—the standard’s prejudice prong.” (quoting
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991) (alteration and emphasis added in Detrich)).
259. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318. Although there this Comment argues that there are strong
reasons why the “substantiality” standard should be modified, based on the discussion in the
previous section, it remains the governing law. As such, it will be referred to as the governing
standard throughout this section. The analysis concerning the three potential levels of prejudice
applies whatever the standard for determining them may be.
260. See id.; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
261. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318.
262. Id.
263. See id.
264. See id.
265. See id. at 1319 (noting that Martinez only concerns “whether there is cause for an apparent
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Because Martinez only provides the “cause” element of “cause and
prejudice,” Coleman prejudice remains a final hurdle to excuse a
procedural default. 266
This Comment argues that the three different findings of prejudice a
district court may make under Martinez and Coleman should be
collapsed into a single analysis focused on the Martinez “substantiality”
prong. This Part will discuss how the three different prejudice
determinations operate within the Martinez/Coleman standard. The latter
two prejudice showings, for the Martinez second prong and for Coleman
“prejudice,” look to the same underlying issue—the prejudice suffered
due to trial counsel’s deficient performance. As the Martinez first prong
requires merely a lessened “substantial” showing of Strickland prejudice
from trial counsel’s deficient performance, mandating an actual
demonstration of prejudice at later stages would render the initial
“substantial” prejudice a moot issue. The three prejudice elements
should be interpreted at the same level if the Martinez first prong is to
have any practical effect.
A.

The Three Levels of Prejudice in the Martinez/Coleman Standard

1.

Level One: The “Substantial” Underlying IATC Claim

Although the exact criteria to determine when a Strickland claim has
“some merit” are not entirely clear,267 the Court did create guideposts to
assist lower courts in differentiating the Martinez “substantiality”
standard from the heavier burden under Strickland. A sufficient “actual
prejudice” showing for a meritorious Strickland claim requires “a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
result . . . would have been different.” 268 The Martinez analogy to
Miller-El, 269 a case in which the Supreme Court allowed a district court
to grant a certificate of appealability when “reasonable jurists would find
the district court’s assessment . . . debatable,” 270 indicates a lessened

default”); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991); Detrich v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1237, 1260
(9th Cir. 2013) (Nguyen, J., concurring).
266. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1315 (noting that “[i]nadequate assistance of counsel at initialreview collateral proceedings may establish cause for a prisoner’s procedural default” (emphasis
added)); Detrich, 740 F.3d at 1260 (9th Cir. 2013) (Nguyen, J., concurring) (noting that Martinez
does not modify Coleman’s cause and prejudice standard).
267. See supra Part IV.
268. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).
269. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318–19.
270. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 338 (2003) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S.
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showing when adjudicating “substantial” Strickland prejudice. 271 If
“reasonable probability” is the standard for “merit,” “some merit” should
consequently be satisfied with something less. Finally, the very use of
the word “substantial” implies a less than total burden. 272 While
Martinez lacks a clear statement of how “substantial” the prejudice
resulting from a trial counsel’s deficient performance must be, it is clear
that it demands less than Strickland.
2.

Level Two: The Ineffectiveness of a Petitioner’s State PCR
Counsel

Any ineffective-assistance-of-counsel finding concerning state PCR
counsel necessarily implicates the underlying IATC claim. In the
Martinez context, state PCR counsel’s deficient performance must be
counsel’s failure to raise a “substantial” claim of IATC. 273 This is
confirmed by the second element of the Martinez test: “the ‘cause’
consisted of there being . . . ‘ineffective’ counsel during the state
collateral review proceeding.” 274 In Martinez, the allegation was that
state PCR counsel “caused” the procedural default by failing to allege
the underlying “substantial” claim. 275 While a literal reading of the
second prong would lead to the assumption that full Strickland “actual
prejudice” is necessary, such an interpretation would seriously impair
the Martinez equitable exception.
For the second prong, the application of Strickland “actual prejudice”
necessarily leads to an analysis of the IATC claim. If the deficient
performance of the state PCR counsel consisted of the failure to assert
the underlying ground for relief, “actual prejudice” must therefore turn
on the potential merits of that claim. There is, in essence, a spectrum of
possible scenarios. This Comment argues that if the IATC claim was so
egregious as to automatically satisfy Strickland “actual prejudice,” a
petitioner must have been prejudiced by state PCR counsel’s deficient

473, 484 (2000)).
271. See supra Part IV.
272. See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra note 133, at
1738 (defining “substantial” as “[c]onsiderable in importance, value, degree, amount, or extent”);
Substantial, supra note 133 (defining “substantial” as “being largely but not wholly that which is
specified”).
273. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318.
274. Trevino v. Thaler, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1918 (2013) (describing Martinez’s four
requirements that, if met, “allow[] a federal habeas court to find ‘cause,’ thereby excusing a
defendant’s procedural default”) .
275. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1314–15.
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performance in failing to raise it.276 If, on the other hand, the underlying
claim had no merit whatsoever, it follows that a petitioner has not been
prejudiced by the decision not to raise it. The answer is much less clear,
however, when the IATC claim is “substantial” under Martinez, yet does
not automatically satisfy Strickland “actual prejudice.”
Because the prejudice showing for the Martinez second prong
implicates the merits of the underlying IATC claim, demanding a full
showing of Strickland “actual prejudice” would render the “substantial”
element of the first prong utterly illusory. There would be little reason
for the Supreme Court to explicitly allow for a lessened showing only to
then demand full Strickland “actual prejudice” one step later. Although
the second prong concerns the ineffectiveness of state PCR counsel, any
analysis of that claim implicates the merits of a petitioner’s underlying
IATC ground for relief. A contrary conclusion would “render
superfluous the first Martinez requirement” of a lessened “substantial”
showing of prejudice from the underlying claim. 277
The Ninth Circuit addressed this distinction in Detrich v. Ryan. 278
That decision, however, may have ventured too far in its collapse of the
Martinez second prong. 279 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that “the Court’s
reference to Strickland . . . where the prisoner had PCR
counsel . . . mean[s] the same thing . . . where the prisoner was pro se in
PCR proceedings.” 280 As discussed above, 281 the prejudice elements for
the underlying trial and state PCR counsel ineffectiveness claims
necessarily must collapse together for the lesser “substantial”
requirement to have any practical effect. This does not, however, mean
that the deficient performance of state PCR counsel may never be
relevant when analyzing the second prong. As the Supreme Court noted,
where state PCR counsel does “perform, according to prevailing

276. As, in this situation, the prejudice stemming from state PCR counsel’s deficient performance
would be intertwined with the underlying prejudice from trial counsel’s deficient performance, the
prejudice finding for both counsels would be the same. The prejudice finding for the second prong
would therefore be automatic, mirroring the determination of the habeas court concerning the
prejudice suffered from trial counsel’s performance. Cf. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658–
59 (1984) (noting that “[t]here are, however, circumstances that are so likely to prejudice the
accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified” and providing
examples of such circumstances).
277. Detrich v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 2013) (collapsing both the deficient
performance and prejudice elements between the first and second Martinez prongs).
278. 740 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 2013).
279. See id. at 1245–46.
280. Id. at 1246.
281. See supra Part V.A.2.
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professional norms . . . the States may enforce a procedural default in
federal habeas proceedings.” 282 Although the deficient performance of
state PCR counsel under Martinez must involve the failure to raise a
“substantial” IATC claim, 283 the Court hints at a situation that does not
rise to the level of deficient performance under Strickland. 284 This may,
for example, be the case where the failure to raise the underlying claim
did not fall “below an objective standard of reasonableness.” 285 As the
Supreme Court expressly left open this possibility, the Ninth Circuit
went too far by fully collapsing the Martinez second prong.
Judge Nguyen, concurring in Detrich, raised a second argument
against merely requiring a finding of substantial prejudice stemming
from state PCR counsel’s deficient performance. 286 Judge Nguyen
highlighted the difference between prejudice from trial counsel and
prejudice from state PCR counsel, reiterating the “narrow exception”
created by the Supreme Court. 287 However, both the trial counsel and
state PCR counsel prejudice analyses look to the same underlying issue:
the deficient performance of trial counsel. If trial counsel did not
perform deficiently and there were no valid arguments for state PCR
counsel to raise during collateral proceedings, state PCR counsel was
almost certainly not performing deficiently when failing to raise those
nonexistent arguments. 288 Further, as Judge Nguyen noted, “[t]here is, of
course, considerable overlap between the two [analyses].” 289
The first two prejudices look to the same underlying issue: the
ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel. As such, requiring the ordinary
Strickland showing of “actual prejudice” in the second prong would
negate the utility of a lessened “substantiality” showing in the first
prong. It hardly seems likely that the Supreme Court would have
intended such an anomaly while crafting an exception for “equitable”
reasons. 290
282. Martinez v. Ryan, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1319 (2012).
283. See supra Part V.A.2.
284. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1319 (noting that a state could argue that “the attorney in the
initial-review collateral proceeding did not perform below constitutional standards”).
285. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). This possibility is beyond the
scope of this Comment and will therefore not be analyzed in detail.
286. Detrich v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1237, 1261 (9th Cir. 2013) (Nguyen, J., concurring).
287. Id.
288. See supra Part V.A.2.
289. Detrich, 740 F.3d at 1262 (quoting Moormann v. Ryan, 628 F.3d 1102, 1106–07 (9th Cir.
2010)).
290. See Martinez v. Ryan, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1319 (2012) (describing Martinez as an
equitable, as opposed to a constitutional, decision).

13 - Ellis - final.docx (Do Not Delete)

2015]
3.

A TALE OF THREE PREJUDICES

4/13/2015 11:59 AM

447

Level Three: The “Prejudice” Required as Part of Demonstrating
“Cause and Prejudice”

Even after overcoming the prejudice hurdles in the first and second
prongs of Martinez, a petitioner must still demonstrate a third prejudice
element to excuse their procedural default: that of the “cause and
prejudice” equitable exception. 291 Martinez only created a “narrow
exception” to the showing required under Coleman. 292 While altering
“cause,” Martinez did not on its face interpret the prejudice element
necessary for the equitable exception. 293 In fact, the Court explicitly left
that prejudice determination for the district court to adjudicate on
remand. 294
In order to satisfy “cause and prejudice,” a petitioner must
“demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the
alleged violation of federal law.” 295 When a petitioner attempts to show
prejudice under Coleman for a defaulted Strickland claim, the Strickland
standard for prejudice is applied. 296 As such, when the underlying claim
is ineffective-assistance-of-counsel, Coleman prejudice may be satisfied
by demonstrating “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” 297
The question then becomes whose deficient performance is relevant
under Martinez to satisfy Coleman prejudice: that of trial counsel or
state PCR counsel? If the court examines trial counsel’s performance,
the analysis will require a typical Strickland showing of prejudice
stemming from that counsel’s deficient performance. 298 If, instead, the
judge interprets “cause and prejudice” as applying to state PCR counsel,
the analysis discussed above in Part V.A.2 takes place.299 Namely, a

291. See id.; Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991); Detrich, 740 F.3d at 1260
(Nguyen, J., concurring).
292. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1315.
293. See Detrich, 740 F.3d at 1261 (Nguyen, J., concurring) (noting that Martinez did not modify
Coleman’s prejudice prong).
294. Martinez, 133 S. Ct. at 1321.
295. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.
296. See Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1054 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that “[w]hen
conducting a ‘prejudice’ analysis in the context of [overcoming a procedural default], this court
applies the standards outline in Strickland”).
297. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).
298. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318.
299. See supra Part V.A.2 (describing how the “prejudice” from a state PCR counsel’s deficient
performance is based on the merits of the underlying trial counsel ineffectiveness claim).
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state PCR counsel’s deficient performance would be the failure to raise
the petitioner’s underlying “substantial” IATC claim, leaving the
Strickland prejudice element necessarily tied to the merits of that ground
for relief. 300
This Comment argues that Coleman prejudice in the Martinez context
should then, as with the Strickland prejudice showing required for state
PCR counsel, necessitate only a “substantial” demonstration that a
petitioner suffered prejudice from the trial counsel’s deficient
performance. If a higher showing of “actual prejudice” was demanded
by “cause and prejudice,” that requirement would erode any equitable
relief available through the lessened prejudice showing in the Martinez
first prong. This seems a highly unlikely outcome given the Supreme
Court’s intentionally lower “substantial” requirement for the IATC
claim. 301 Why would the Court go to the trouble of designing a
complicated equitable exception only to immediately undermine the
standard by making the lessened requirement largely superfluous? Such
a result would leave the “substantiality” showing a moot issue, utterly
useless for habeas petitioners who have “substantial,” yet unproven, trial
counsel Strickland claims. Although Coleman may, on its face, demand
a “more searching prejudice inquiry,” 302 the more logical and
straightforward way of applying Coleman prejudice in the Martinez
context would require merely the same “substantiality” standard as with
the two prejudice findings scattered through the Martinez test.
B.

Because All Prejudice Determinations Should be Based on
Whether There Is “Substantial” Strickland “Actual Prejudice,”
More Petitioners Should Be Allowed Through the “Martinez
Gateway”

All three prejudices potentially required by Martinez and Coleman
should be determined based on whether a petitioner can demonstrate
“substantial” prejudice from the trial counsel’s alleged ineffective
behavior. This will generally require an expanded record to take into
account any explanation from the trial counsel. 303 Another commentator
has suggested that district courts hold evidentiary hearings before

300. See supra Part V.A.2.
301. See Martinez, 133 S. Ct. at 1318 (noting that “[t]o overcome the default, a prisoner must also
demonstrate that the underlying ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim is a substantial one,
which is to say that the prisoner must demonstrate that the claim has some merit”).
302. Detrich v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1237, 1261 (9th Cir. 2013) (Nguyen, J., concurring).
303. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318.
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allowing a petitioner through the “Martinez gateway.” 304 This Comment
suggests, however, that it is more straightforward to hold the evidentiary
hearing after a petitioner has passed through the “Martinez gateway.”
1.

Proposed Alternative: Evidentiary Hearings to Determine “Actual
Prejudice” Before Being Allowed Through the “Martinez
Gateway”

Following similar reasoning found in Detrich, 305 a commentator has
argued that although the first two prejudice findings should be
adjudicated based on a “substantial” standard, the final prejudice
mandated by “cause and prejudice” should not. 306 This would require a
petitioner, after showing “cause” under Martinez, to demonstrate full
“actual prejudice” in order to have his IATC claims adjudicated on the
merits. 307 Petitioners would be allowed discovery and an evidentiary
hearing in order to develop the factual record to a level satisfying “actual
prejudice.” 308 The Ninth Circuit has tacitly approved this approach. 309
The court noted that evidentiary hearings would be permitted under 28
U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) to determine whether “cause” exists under
Martinez. 310
2.

Evidentiary Hearings on a Petitioner’s Underlying IATC Claims
Should be Held After the Petitioner Has Been Allowed Through
the “Martinez Gateway”

Holding the evidentiary hearing before a petitioner is allowed through
the “Martinez gateway” seems to produce an incorrect outcome based on
the structure of Martinez. The prejudice inquiry required to satisfy
Coleman prejudice, as with that for the Martinez second prong, looks to
the same underlying issue: that of trial counsel’s allegedly deficient

304. See Konrad, supra note 14, at 323–25.
305. See Detrich, 740 F.3d at 1246.
306. See Konrad, supra note 14, at 323 (arguing that “[r]eading Martinez to allow for the
substantial-claim standard to suffice for PCR prejudice means that the default prejudice would
remain consistent with precedent that a prisoner must show ‘actual prejudice as a result of the
alleged violation of the law’”).
307. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1319.
308. Konrad, supra note 14, at 324–25.
309. See Dickens v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1302, 1321 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Section 2254(e)(2), however,
does not bar a hearing before the district court to allow a petitioner to show ‘cause’ under
Martinez.”).
310. See id.

13 - Ellis - final.docx (Do Not Delete)

450

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

4/13/2015 11:59 AM

[Vol. 90:405

performance. 311 Demanding a higher standard would degrade the
“substantiality” inquiry to a meaningless procedural hoop for petitioners
to jump through. This is unlikely to be the Supreme Court’s desired
result, considering that Martinez was intended to create an option for
federal habeas petitioners to revive IATC claims that were lost or
defaulted through no fault of their own. 312
This Comment therefore argues that such an evidentiary hearing into
the merits of an IATC claim should be withheld until the district court
actually has the power to rule on the merits. As the Supreme Court
noted, an evidentiary fact-finding hearing is often required to complete
the record for ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. 313 As such, when
a Martinez motion is granted, a district court will very likely be forced to
hold an evidentiary hearing to develop a substantial enough record to
make a ruling on the merits of the claim. 314
It is more straightforward for a court to analyze the four prongs of
Martinez, excuse the petitioner’s procedural default, and only then
proceed to the merits with an evidentiary hearing. Were the evidentiary
hearing to take place before a finding of Coleman prejudice, one of two
possibilities would result. Courts could opt for the woefully inefficient
option of holding an evidentiary hearing solely on Coleman prejudice
and then convening a second proceeding on the merits. Few courts
would, however, so willingly squander scarce judicial resources. 315
Alternatively, courts could hold an evidentiary hearing to both determine
the existence of Coleman prejudice and adjudicate the merits of the
underlying IATC claim. This method would result in holding an
evidentiary hearing on the merits of a claim that remains procedurally
defaulted only to potentially excuse the default and grant habeas relief in
the same order.
It seems preferable to keep Martinez and the merits of the underlying
311. See supra Part V.A.3.
312. See Martinez v. Ryan, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1318 (2012).
313. Id.
314. This, for example, is what the court did in Weber v. Sinclair. There the court first found all
the Martinez elements satisfied, including a finding of Coleman prejudice, and then granted an
evidentiary hearing on the merits of the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. See Weber v.
Sinclair, No. C08-1676RSL, 2014 WL 1671508, at *9, *10 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 28, 2014) (granting
an evidentiary hearing on petitioner’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims “that could not have
been raised on direct appeal because they rely on evidence outside the record”).
315. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979) (noting that various
doctrines have the purpose of “promoting judicial economy by preventing needless litigation”);
Emp’rs Council on Flexible Comp. v. Feltman, No. 1:08cv371 (JCC), 2009 WL 8705813, at *4
(E.D. Va. Aug. 20, 2009) (noting that “the Court is not in the habit of expending judicial resources
to hear two days of argument and evidence that may or may not be relevant”).

13 - Ellis - final.docx (Do Not Delete)

2015]

A TALE OF THREE PREJUDICES

4/13/2015 11:59 AM

451

IATC claim separated. This would maintain a lessened bar for Coleman
prejudice—a modification implicit in Martinez. A district court could
then hold an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the underlying claim
once the procedural hurdles have been cleared. As all three potential
prejudice inquiries look to the same underlying issue, this method seems
to make the most sense for courts searching for simpler and more
expeditious routes to analyze Martinez arguments. This result would, as
with the generally lessened “substantiality” finding argued for in Part
IV, expand the availability of the “Martinez gateway,” allowing more
IATC claims to be adjudicated on the merits by federal district courts.
CONCLUSION
Martinez v. Ryan allows habeas petitioners a second chance to have
their previously unadjudicated IATC claims analyzed by a federal
district court. While this faint ray of hope may not seem like much in the
grand scheme of things, to individual petitioners it represents everything
because it may be their last shot at contesting an allegedly unfair
conviction. However, the “Martinez gateway” is not perfect. This
Comment has laid out some of the complexities concerning the Martinez
standard and offered solutions to these problems. Additional evidentiary
hearings would hopefully increase the likelihood of more meritorious
IATC claims being uncovered by federal district courts. These
suggestions, while individually minor, would permit more petitioners to
pass through the gateway and have their IATC claims adjudicated on the
merits. More than that, however, Martinez is meant to give petitioners
who were unfairly deprived of the ability to adjudicate their IATC
claims on the merits a second chance. Even if few of those claims are
meritorious and result in relief, the ability to give finality to convictions
as well as a day in court to habeas petitioners is a worthwhile goal.

